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ABSTRACT 
 
 
THOMAS E. HIEBERT. How is the value of real estate affected by the               
Department of Defense Base Realignment and Closure Process? 
(Under the direction of DR. RICHARD J. BUTTIMER, JR.) 
 
 
This study examines the Department of Defense Base Realignment and Closure 
(BRAC) process as it relates to real estate prices in the communities surrounding the 
bases marked for closure and realignment.  I examine the history of the BRAC process, 
detail the bases that have been marked for realignment and closure over the five “rounds” 
of the BRAC process to date (1988, 1991, 1993, 1995, 2005), and present a model that 
tests the hypothesis that BRAC closure announcements are correlated with the value of 
real estate in the local communities surrounding the bases marked for closure.  I find that 
there is a strong and statistically significant correlation between the BRAC process, 
particularly the series of announcements that occur within the BRAC timeline, and the 
value of real estate in the local communities affected by the BRAC process. I al o discuss 
policy implications of these findings for the Department of Defense, as well as future 
research areas and opportunities that have arisen as a result of this study. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
 
In the fall of 2008, Kristin Hall of the Associated Press reported on a story  
related to the ongoing housing/ mortgage crisis in the United States that barely garnered a 
ripple of attention in the national media.  Hall’s story, entitled “Military bases helping 
protect nearby housing markets,” studied the residential real estate markts outside four 
military bases across the country: Eglin Air Force Base (Fort Walton Beach, Florida, 
population 21,000); Fort Bragg (Fayetteville, North Carolina, population 168,000); Fort 
Campbell (Clarksville, Tennessee, population 117,000); and Minot Air Force Base 
(Minot, North Dakota, population 37,000).  Drawing upon transactional real estate data 
from these four communities, the study demonstrated that while the vast majority of the 
country saw average home prices drop at double-digit rates in 2007 and 2008, these four 
communities actually experienced increasing, or at the very least, steady home values 
during this same period.  For example, according to the Office of Federal Housing 
Enterprise Oversight, which uses data from Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and includes 
more than 5 million repeat sales transactions, average home prices in the U.S. fell a 
record 4.8 percent in the third quarter of 2008 compared with the same period in 2007.  
Some areas of Florida, California and Nevada fell even further, down between 14 and 16 
percent from the year before.1 
                                                
1 Kristin Hall, “Military bases helping protect nearby housing markets,” Associated Press: 11 November 
2008. 
2 
 
But around both Fort Campbell and Minot Air Force Base, the average sales 
prices for single family homes increased almost 6 percent, from $139,065 to $147,460 in 
the third quarter of 2008 compared to the same period in 2007.   Homes in the 
communities surrounding Fort Bragg experienced similar increases in property values.  
The average price for an existing home in Fayetteville was up 5.2 percent in the third 
quarter of 2008; from $123,912 in 2007 to $130,355 in 2008.2   
Why is this the case? As the general manager of a regional homebuilder with an 
office in Fayetteville said, "We are faring very well here… it is a solid year for us. We 
are doing better than most of the markets because the military gives us a very stable 
influence."3  Simply put, due to the continuous turnover on military bases, a steady 
income (one of the major program initiatives of the Bush Administration was to “close 
the pay gap,” that is, bring the military pay scale more in line with that of working class 
America; as such service members received an average annual pay increase of between 
3.5% and 4.5% between 2001 and 2008), and an additional housing allowance (called 
variable housing allowance, or VHA, as rates are paid based on both military rank and 
geographic region of the country), military bases are generally seen a a boom to the local 
economy, and this is reflected in the value of homes in the community, as well.   
Thus, if this is indeed the case, and I believe it is, then what effect would we 
expect to see in the value of residential property in the local community if a base 
suddenly closed down?  More directly, how does the mere threat of base closure, as 
demonstrated through the Department of Defense’s Base Realignment and Closure
(BRAC) process, in which a series of announcements are made by the Secretary of 
                                                
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid. 
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Defense and an independent Commission, affect the value of real estate in the local 
communities surrounding the bases marked for closure?  This paper attempts to answer 
that question.  Specifically, this paper addresses the formal hypothesis: how does the 
Department of Defense Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process affect the value 
of real estate in local communities, where the null hypothesis is that the BRAC process 
has no effect on the value of real estate in local communities.   
In the Background section of the paper, I provide a detailed account of the BRAC 
process: the history of the program, why it was deemed necessary to the national security 
of the United States of America to formally establish such a process under law, and what 
has occurred with respect to specific base realignment and closure activity as a result of 
BRAC since its inception in 1988.  In the Literature Review, I then provide a detaile  
review of the literature corresponding to the study that I have undertaken here: a r view 
of the relevant literature on the economic impacts of the BRAC process on local 
communities across the United States; and a review of the literature corresponding to the 
methodology that I will follow in my research, that is, a review of hedonic pricing models 
and event study methodology.  In the Data and Methodology section, I describe the 
communities and the data I have chosen to study in my quest for an answer to the 
problem: why I chose to study the communities that I did, while others were omitted; 
how I gathered the data required to complete the study; and a detailed description of the 
data, its own special characteristics, along with the special requirements I had of the data 
in order to complete this study.   
In the Empirical Results and Discussion section, I provide an account of my 
empirical results, detailed analysis of these results, and the answers they provide with 
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respect to the research question.  These results clearly demonstrate that th re is a strong 
and statistically significant correlation between the BRAC process, particul ly the series 
of announcements that occur within the BRAC timeline, and the value of real estate in the 
local communities affected by the BRAC process.  Thus, I disprove the null hypothesis, 
that is, that the BRAC process does not affect the value of real estate in local 
communities.   
   Finally, I close the paper with a detailed discussion of the policy implications 
inherent in my findings.  First and foremost among these is that if real estate in local 
communities is indeed affected by the BRAC process and the series of announcements 
imbedded within the process, then the Department of Defense must account for this effect 
through the manner and methodology with which it announces which bases will close.  In 
line with these implications, I also provide a detailed list of areas for future study, as I 
believe that I have barely touched the surface of all the valuable work that can and should 
be done in this area of vital importance to both the academic community and the 
Department of Defense.   
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CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND 
 
 
2.1 Background and History of the BRAC Process 
The decade since the last BRAC has been a period of dramatic change.  The U.S. 
national security strategy addresses the new challenges posed by international 
terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, ungoverned areas, 
rogue states, and non-state actors.   BRAC 2005 provides the Department [of 
Defense] a new unique opportunity to adjust U.S. base structure to meet these 
developments, and to meet the challenges envisioned during the next two decades. 
      
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld 
      13 May 20054 
 
One of the most politically contentious processes undertaken by the Department 
of Defense (DOD) since the end of the Cold War in the late 1990s, and the onset of the 
overhaul and transformation of the entire U.S. military over the past decade, is the Base 
Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process.  While the transformation of both military 
force structure and weapons platforms across all the services has largely been a matter for 
the Department of Defense and the President to determine, the question of which military 
bases to realign and shut down was determined to be too politically sensitive to be left up 
to decision-makers within the Department of Defense alone.  Instead, the formal process, 
known formally as the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process, was established 
by law in 1988 in order to protect shield the process from parochial political influences.5   
                                                
4 Donald M. Rumsfeld, introductory letter to the Chairman of the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure 
(BRAC) Commission, 13 May 2005, The Pentagon, Arlingto , Virginia, p.1.  
5 Dardia, Michael, et. al., “The Effect of Military Base Closures on Local Communities: A Short Term 
Perspective,” Rand: National Defense Research Institute, 1996, pp.1-2. 
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Much of this sensitivity is due simply to the concern for the fate of the 
communities surrounding the closed bases; such concerns are understandable in light of 
the fact that in many of these communities, the personnel working on base, both military
and civilian, represent a significant share of the local population and employ ent base.  
Even communities with promising alternative uses for the local base (especially those 
with pre-existing runways, mature transportation nodes, and/or the capacity for petroleum 
storage) seem wary of the immediate effects of the closure, with its loss of civilian jobs 
and the direct loss of input to the local economy in the way of lost revenue through 
property taxes and local sales and income taxes, as well as through lost retail al s 
resulting from the closure of a military base.  Though Dardia (1996) tells us that the long-
term experience with base closures seems to have little negative effect on the surrounding 
community,6  little is known about the size or distribution of the immediate (or even long-
term) impacts of base closures with respect to the value of real estate.  If th  effects are 
adverse, intuitively they ought to be most severe immediately after the closure, before 
there is time for local and regional real estate markets to recover and for the
compensatory effects of base reuse plans to materialize. 
Though instituted formally under law in 1988, the BRAC process had its origins 
in the 1960s. Cognizant of the fact that the DoD had to reduce the base structure that it 
had created largely to support and fight the Second World War, President John F. 
Kennedy directed Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara to develop and implement 
an extensive base realignment and closure program in order to compensate for the 
                                                
6 Ibid., p.7. 
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changing economic and political realities of the 1960s.7  In its infancy, the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense (OSD) established its own criteria to govern the selection of bases 
marked for closure, without consulting either the United States Congress or the separate 
branches of the United States military (the Departments of the Army, Nav, Air Force 
and Marine Corps). Under Secretary McNamara's guidance, the Departmnt of Defense 
closed sixty bases in the early 1960s without either Congressional approval or the 
involvement of other government agencies outside the Department of Defense.8  In light 
of the presumed enormous immediate economic and ensuing political ramifications of 
these closures, Congress determined that it had to be personally involved in the process
and passed legislation in 1965 that required the DoD to report any base closure programs 
through an official notification program.  President Lyndon B. Johnson vetoed the bill, 
however, and thus allowed the DoD to continue closing bases without either 
congressional oversight or approval throughout most of the remainder of the decade.9                                                       
Heightened economic and political pressures eventually forced Congress to 
intervene in the process of realigning and closing military bases around the United States, 
especially as it sought to end the DoD's ability to operate completely independent from 
Congress and outside the law on the matter.  On 1 August 1977, President Jimmy Carter 
signed Public Law 95-82.  This law required the Secretary of Defense to notify C ngress 
when a base was a candidate for reduction or closure; to prepare studies on the strategic, 
environmental, and local economic impact and consequences of such action; and to wait 
sixty days for a congressional response before acting on the closure.  Codified as Section 
                                                
7 Department of Defense Base Realignment and Closure Commission Report, December 1988, U.S. 
Government Printing Officer, pp.7-8. 
8 Ibid., p.8. 
9 Ibid., pp.8-9. 
8 
 
2687, Title 10, United States Code, this legislation, along with the requirements of the 
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) permitted Congress to nullify any DoD 
attempt to initiate base realignment and closure studies unilaterally by refusing to 
approve them, and thus gave Congress an integral role in the initial phases of the BRAC 
process.10  
As the U.S. economy fell into recession and the country was beset by mounting 
domestic and international unrest in the late 1970s and early 1980s (least of all the 444-
day Iranian hostage crisis in 1979-1981 and the failed rescue attempt in April 1980), the 
U.S. defense budget fell to its lowest level (as a percentage of U.S. GDP) since ju t prior 
to the Second World War.11  This, in turn, intensified pressure on the DoD to close 
military installations that many in Congress believed were superfluous and no longer 
necessary, especially in light of heightened budgetary constraints.  In 1983, in an effort to 
find significant cost savings throughout the colossal Department of Defense budg t, 
President Ronald Reagan appointed a bipartisan committee to study cost-cutting 
measures across all program and directorates within the Department of Defense.  This 
commission, formally known as the President's Private Sector Survey on Cost Control, or 
the Grace Commission, concluded in its final report to the President that substantial 
budgetary savings could be realized through cuts in base structure, and recommended the 
creation of a bipartisan, independent commission to study base realignment and closure
across the entire DoD.12  The DoD did not immediately act upon this recommendation.  
As a result of glasnost in the Soviet Union, the march towards the end of the Cold War, 
                                                
10 Ibid., p. 9. 
11 I discovered this in conducting research for a previous study on the Department of Defense Budget from 
1945-2007.  The source for this information is the 2008 Department of Defense Budget, October 2007.  
12 Congressional Research Service,  “Military Base Closures: A Historical Review from 1988 to 1995.  
Updated 18 October 2004,” 18 October 2004, pp.6-7. 
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and the subsequent draw-down of U.S. military forces both domestically and overseas, 
however, the Secretary of Defense recognized the requirement to close exce s bases to 
save money, and therefore chartered the Commission on Base Realignment and Closure 
in 1988 to recommend military bases within the United States for realignment and 
closure.13                                             
Formally enacted as Public Law 100-526 (PL 100-526) on 24 October 1988, the 
law directed the creation of a bipartisan Commission, appointed by the Secretary of 
Defense and approved by the Congress, which would make recommendations to 
Congress on base realignments and closures, and that had to be voted down or accepted 
as a whole.14  Congress has subsequently enacted two additional laws since 1988 that 
provide for the realignment and closure of military installations across the Unit d States. 
Since 1988, there have been five successive formal Base Realignment and Closure 
(BRAC) Commissions (1988, 1991, 1993, 1995, and 2005) which recommended the 
closure of 125 major military facilities and 225 minor military bases and installations and 
the realignment of the operational and functional capabilities of 145 others.15   
The Department of Defense defines “minor” installations as those bases with a 
workforce population of less than 2,500 combined military and civilian contract 
personnel.  In the 2008 Base Structure Report, the Department of Defense further 
categories bases as large, medium and small as: 
Large Site – total Plant Replacement Value (PRV) ≥ $1.665 billion 
Medium Site – total PRV < $1.665 billion but ≥ $888 million 
Small Site – total PRV < $888 million16 
 
                                                
13 Congressional Research Service, 18 October 2004, p.12. 
14 Congressional Research Service, 18 October 2004, p. 2. 
15 2005 DoD BRAC report, p. 17. 
16 Department of 2008 Defense Base Structure Report, 30 September 2007, p. 22. 
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By another estimate, the first four BRAC rounds achieved 97 base closings and 55 major 
realignments. According to the Department of Defense, this resulted in net savings to 
taxpayers of over $16 billion through 2001, and over $6 billion in additional savings 
annually.17                                                          
The primary mechanism for implementing the BRAC process in both statutes has 
been the independent, bipartisan Commission, appointed by the President and approved 
by the Congress, mandated in Public Law 100-526. Two of the most pressing issues faced 
by the Commission while in the performance of its regulatory responsibilities are (1) 
providing assistance to local communities which have been economically impacted by 
base closures and (2) establishing a cost-effective program for the proper environmental 
clean-up at bases prior to their final closure.  Prior to 1988, the Secretary of Defense 
could close a major military base only when the Congress approved his recommendation 
and authorized the necessary funding. Under this system, the Congress approved base 
closures on a case-by-case basis, and required the Department of Defense to submit 
exhaustive reports on the potential strategic, environmental, and local economic 
consequences of closing a base.18  
Congress refined the process in 1990 with another law (PL 101-510) that charged 
the Defense Department with drawing up an initial list of bases for consideration by the 
Commission.19  This commission, in accordance with a statutory provision, was required 
to convene in 1991, 1993, and 1995. Named the Defense Base Closure and Realignment 
                                                
17 2005 DoD BRAC report, p.17. 
18 United States Congress, Congressional Budget Office, “Closing Military Bases: An Interim Assessment,” 
U.S. Government Printing Office, December 1996, p. 10. 
19 Ibid. 
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Act of 1990 (1990 Base Closure Act), Public Law 101-510 further codified the process 
by which Department of Defense installations would be closed and/or realigned.20  
Under the formal BRAC process (as established by Public Laws 100-526 and 
101-510), the Secretary of Defense makes recommendations on base closures and 
realignments to an independent Commission.  This Commission is nominated by the 
President, and confirmed by the United States Senate. The Commission, after being 
confirmed by the Senate, reviews the recommendations made by the Secretary of 
Defense, and takes up to 120 days to: (1) conduct public hearings on the recommended 
base closures; (2) conduct installation site visits and conduct on-site interviews; (3) 
conduct independent analysis to confirm or deny the Secretary of Defense’s 
recommended base closure and realignment list. In order to reject, change, or add new 
recommendations to the Secretary of Defense’s recommended list, the Commissi n u t 
first show that the Secretary of Defense “deviated substantially” from the Department of 
Defense force structure plan.  In addition, the Commission can only add a base closure to 
the list if at least seven of the nine members vote in favor of it, and at least two of the 
nine actually visit the installation.21  
Once the Commission has completed its analysis of the Secretary of Defense’s 
recommended realignment and closure, it presents its own recommendations to the 
President in a formal document.  The President then reviews the recommendations, and 
either sends the list back to the Commission for additional work, whereby the 
Commission would be given five more weeks to formalize its new recommendations to 
the President, or forwards the recommendations, without changes, to the Congress.  The 
                                                
20 Ibid., pp. 17-18. 
21 Department of Defense, “Base Realignment and Closure,” Information brief to members of Congress, 
Washington, D.C.: 10 May 2005, pp.6-8. 
12 
 
Congress then has forty-five days to enact a joint resolution of the House and Senate 
disapproving of the Commission’s list on an all-or-none basis, or the recommendations 
become binding and are signed into law by the President.22                
The introduction of the BRAC process instituted a new approach requiring the 
Congress to authorize or reject closing a group of bases recommended by the BRAC 
Commission, an independent bipartisan commission. The BRAC Commission's 
recommendations were based on proposals submitted by the Department of Defense and 
approved by the President. The new process precluded the Congress from making 
adjustments to the Commissions' recommendations and facilitated the process by 
reducing reporting requirements. Congressional legislation governing BRAC procedures 
required the Department of Defense to begin closing bases within two years of the 
Commission’s final report and approval of the President, and to complete BRAC actions 
within an additional two years from the date of their approval.23 
The Secretary of Defense issues guidelines to the four armed services to ensure 
that, first and foremost, military requirements are at the forefront of all decision-making 
criteria when determining which bases to recommend for realignment or closure (see 
Table 1).  The strategic military value of an installation is foremost among the selection 
criteria issued by the Secretary of Defense.  The requirement to make military value the 
primary consideration when making realignment and closure recommendations was 
stressed in a 14 October 2005 Defense Department memorandum in which the Servic  
Secretaries were advised to use the “BRAC Military Value Principles” (see Table 2) to 
ultimately determine which bases to maintain-- or to close down. 
                                                
22 Ibid., p.9. 
23 Ibid. 
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Table 1: Secretary of Defense Selection Criteria for Base Closure or R alignment 
Recommendation24 
 
Military Value
1. The current and future mission capabilities and the impact on operational 
readiness of the Department of Defense's total force, in luding the impact on 
joint warfighting, training, and readiness.
2. The availability and condition of land, facilities and associated airspace
(including training areas suitable for maneuver by ground, naval, or air forces
throughout a diversity of climate and terrain areas and staging areas for the 
use of the Armed Forces in homeland defense mission) at both existing
and potential receiving locations.
3. The ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, surge, and future 
total force requirements at both existing and potential receiving locations to 
support operations and training.
4. The cost of operations and the manpower implications.
Other Considerations
5. The extent and timing of potential costs and savings, including the
number of years, beginning with the date of completion of the
closure or realignment, for the savings to exceed th  costs.
6. The economic impact on existing communities in the vicinity of
military installations.
7. The ability of both the existing and potential receiving communities'
infrastructure to support forces, missions, and personnel.
8. The environmental impact, including the impact of costs related to
potential environmental restoration, waste management, and
environmental compliance activities.
 
 
  
                                                
24 These seven criteria were added to Public Law 108-375, the Ronald Reagan National Defense 
Authorization Act of 2005, in order to amend the current law governing the BRAC process, P.L. 101-510.  
They were reiterated in am informational memorandum signed on 4 January 2005 by the Under Secretary 
of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics). 
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Table 2: BRAC Value Principles25 
 
Recruit and Train: The Department must attract, develop, and retain active, reserve, 
civilian, and contractor personnel who are highly skilled and educated and have access to 
effective, diverse, and sustainable training space in order to ensure current and future 
readiness, to support advances in technology, and to respond to anticipated developments 
in joint and service doctrine and tactics.  
 
Quality of Life: The Department must provide a quality of life, including quality of  
work place that supports recruitment, learning, and training, and enhances retention.  
 
Organize: The Department needs force structure sized, composed, and located to match 
the demands of the National Military Strategy, effectively and efficiently supported by 
properly aligned headquarters and other DoD organizations, and that takes advantage of 
opportunities for joint basing.  
 
Equip: The Department needs research, development, acquisition, test, and evaluation 
capabilities that efficiently and effectively place superior technology in the hands of the 
warfighter to meet current and future threats and facilitate knowledge-enabled and net-
centric warfare.  
 
Supply, Service, and Maintain: The Department needs access to logistical and industrial 
infrastructure capabilities optimally integrated into a skilled and cost efficient national 
industrial base that provides agile and responsive global support to operational forces.  
 
Deploy & Employ (Operational): The Department needs secure installations that are 
optimally located for mission accomplishment (including homeland defense), that support 
power projection, rapid deployable capabilities, and expeditionary force needs for reach-
back capability, that sustain the capability to mobilize and surge, and that ensure strategic 
redundancy.  
 
Intelligence: The Department needs intelligence capabilities to support the National 
Military Strategy by delivering predictive analysis, warning of impending crises, 
providing persistent surveillance of our most critical targets, and achieving horizontal 
integration of networks and databases.  
 
 
Other evaluative factors include the availability and condition of land, facilities, 
and airspace; the ability to meet contingency requirements; potential cost and savings; 
and potential environmental and local economic impact.  The services apply these factors 
in examining their facilities in each of five major categories: fighting, training, industrial, 
                                                
25 Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics), informational memorandum to 
Secretaries of the military departments, The Pentago , Arlington, Virginia, 14 October 2004. 
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medical, and command and control. Using the Cost of Base Realignment Actions 
(COBRA) model, the services determine which bases are surplus in each of the categories  
and recommend closure and realignment actions to the Secretary of Defense accordingly.  
First developed for use and assistance with BRAC 1988, COBRA is an economic 
analysis model that makes use of simulation and the financial principals of net pres nt 
value (NPV) and payback period (PB) in order to estimate both the costs and savings 
associated with all proposed base closure or realignment action in a current BRAC round. 
As such, the COBRA model output is used extensively to compare the relative cost 
benefits of alternative BRAC actions.26  
Under the existing laws, the Secretary of Defense then submits his 
recommendations to the President for review before forwarding a final list of proposed 
actions to the BRAC Commission. The process thereby prevents the Congress from 
making any uninformed or premature adjustments to the Commissions' recommendations 
before authorizing the Department of Defense to proceed with closures and 
realignments.27 
With the procedural requirements mandated by law in mind, it is important to 
examine the direct results of each successive BRAC round, beginning with the first 
formal BRAC round of 1988.  During the decade of the 1980’s, no major military bases 
were closed, largely because of the aforementioned procedural requirements establi hed 
by Congress. After several legislative efforts to break the deadlock failed, Congress 
introduced a new base closure procedure (P.L. 100-526, enacted on October 24, 1988).28 
                                                
26 United States Department of Defense, Cost of Base Realignment Actions (COBRA) User’s Manual, 
2005, pp. 3-4. 
27 CBO Report, December 1996, p. 10. 
28 Congressional Research Service report, 18 October 2004, pp.14-15. 
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The original base-closing law was designed to minimize political interferenc ; as 
previously stated, this new law established a bipartisan commission to make 
recommendations to Congress and the Secretary of Defense on closures and 
realignments. Lawmakers had to accept or reject the commission’s report in its entirety.  
Along with the additions provided in subsequent legislation, this characteristic of the law 
remains in effect today.  On 28 December 1988, the first BRAC Commission issued its 
report, recommending closure of 86 installations, partial closure of 5, and realignment of 
54 others. The President approved its recommendation on January 5, 1989.29  Since the 
commission approach adopted by Congress was successful, new base closure legislation 
was introduced which also relied on the services of an independent commission.  
From 1989 to 2000, the Department of Defense reduced the total size of its active 
duty military component by 32 percent, from over 2,000,000 in 1989 to fewer than 
1,400,000 in 2000.30  After four successive rounds of base closing (1988, 1991, 1993, and 
1995), however, only 21 percent of the military installations in the continental United 
States had been closed or realigned.31  Before the first base closure round, there were 
approximately 500 military bases in the United States and its territories.32  After all of the 
bases from the first four BRAC rounds were closed, only 400 bases remained, not 
including those remaining overseas.  By 2008 the Department of Defense had also 
reduced its overseas base structure by nearly 75 percent, closing down the operational 
capacity of over 960 facilities and handing the land on which it sat back to the 
                                                
29 Ibid., p.16. 
30 U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review, 30 September 2001, p.76. 
31 Ibid., p.77. 
32 According to the DoD Base Structure Report, pages 36-75, the U.S. maintains facilities in American 
Samoa, Guam, Johnston Atoll, Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, U.S. Virgin Islands, and the Wake 
Islands. 
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government of the host nation. The Army in Europe alone has closed the equivalent of 25 
United States major maneuver bases.33  
The 1995 BRAC Commission Report estimated that the implementation of the 
BRAC actions in the first four rounds would result in $23 billion in one-time 
implementation costs, offset by savings of $36.5 billion, for a total net savings of $13.5 
billion between 1990 and 2001, when the implementation of the first four rounds was 
supposed to be concluded.34  The Commission further concluded that the Department of 
Defense did not include the total cost of environmental cleanup beyond 2001 in the net 
savings figures.35  Approximately half the savings which the Department of Defense 
predicted would come from BRAC during the implementation of the Commission’s 
recommendations (determined presumably through the use of the COBRA model) were 
due to assumed savings in operation and maintenance costs.  However, much of those 
assumed savings turned out to be the result of the reductions in civilian personnel brought 
about by the closing of selected bases.36  
The 1995 BRAC process also produced some nefarious political dealing which 
ultimately resulted in a ten-year gap between it and the next round of BRAC in 2005.  
The 1995 BRAC Commission recommended closing two maintenance depots, McClellan 
Air Logistics Center near Sacramento, CA, and Kelly Air Logistics Center in San 
Antonio, TX. As an alternative to shutting the depots in the two politically powerful 
states, President Bill Clinton proposed having private contractors take over maintenance 
work at the sites. The 1995 Base Closure Commission did not recommend, nor authorize, 
                                                
33 U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review, 6 February 2006, p.52. 
34 1995 BRAC Commission Report, Washington, D.C., 1 July 1995, pp. 27-28. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid., p. 35. 
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this seeming “privatization-in-place” at either Kelly or McClellan. Thus, Congress was 
bound, by law, to either approve the BRAC Commission recommendations (whereby 
Kelly and McClellan would both be closed down) or disapprove the entire list as a whole,
in which case all the work of both the Department of Defense and the BRAC 
Commission throughout the year would be null and void.  Concern was raised about the 
integrity of the BRAC process in light of this attempt keep these two bases open des ite 
the BRAC Commissions formal recommendations.  Ultimately, they were left op n, and 
Republicans in Congress charged that the President could not be trusted to respec th  
apolitical nature of the entire BRAC process, as mandated in and required by law.37  
As a direct result of the President’s actions, and with a significant shift in the 
balance of power in both the United States Senate and House of Representatives as a 
result of the 1998 mid-term elections, lawmakers in both the House and Senate could not 
agree until 2001 to schedule another round of base closings. Before the matter was 
resolved, the dispute held up a conference agreement on the fiscal 2002 defense 
authorization bill (PL 107-107) and led then President George W. Bush to threaten to 
veto the bill if it did not allow a new round in 2005.38  Defense Secretary Donald H. 
Rumsfeld and Army General Hugh Shelton, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told the 
House Armed Services Committee in July 2001 that the Pentagon maintained 25 percent 
more facilities than it needed, even after the first four rounds of base closings.  By some 
accounts, the excess military bases annually cost taxpayers an estimated $3.5 billion.39  
Furthermore, the events of September 11th 2001, and subsequent U.S. involvement in 
                                                
37 1995 BRAC Commission Report, p.74. 
38 Congressional Research Service Report, 18 October 2004, pp. 15-16. 
39 Ibid., pp.16-17. 
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combat operations in Afghanistan in October 2001 and in Iraq in March 2003 caused the 
process to stall indefinitely.   
The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) concluded that additional 
infrastructure savings were required to begin to reduce the share of the defense budget 
devoted to infrastructure. Retaining excess base infrastructure is unnecessary with a 
smaller military force, and wastes scarce defense resources that are essential to future 
military modernization. Base closings are an integral part of this plan. The QDR found 
that the Department has enough excess base structure to warrant two additional rounds of 
BRAC, similar in scale to 1993 and 1995. The Department estimated that two additional 
base closure rounds would result in savings of approximately $2.7 billion annually.40  
Thus, Public Law 108-375, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2005, directed that the Department of Defense make recommendations on future 
base closures no later than 15 March 2005, and that the President form a new BRAC 
Commission in accordance with the guidance laid out in Public Law 101-510.41 With the 
four branches of the armed services focused on the improvement of installation 
operations, the office of the Secretary of Defense was then free to begin the detail d 
examination of efficiencies that could be obtained by such actions as consolidation of 
functions on installations, regionalization of support, base realignments and closures, and 
creation of joint installations where facilities are shared by active forc s, National Guard, 
and Reserve components of all the services.42  
 
                                                
40 U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review, 30 September 2001, p.25. 
41 U.S. Congress, Public Law 108-375, “National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005,” 
Washington, D.C.: 28 October 2004, pp. 322-325. 
42 Congressional Research Service Report, 16 October 2008, pp.33-34. 
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Table 3: Comparing BRAC Rounds 
Minor Annual
Major Major Closures Recurring
Base Base and Costs Savings
Closures Realignments Realignments ($B) (FY05 $B)
BRAC 88 16 4 23 2.7 0.9
BRAC 91 26 17 32 5.2 2.0
BRAC 93 28 12 123 7.6 2.6
BRAC 95 27 22 57 6.5 1.7
Total (88 - 95) 97 55 235 22 7.3
BRAC 05 33 29 775 24.4 5.5
 
BRAC 2005 has been a significant change to previous BRAC rounds.  Though, as 
in previous BRAC rounds, many bases (a total of 177) were marked for closure (see 
Table 3), BRAC 2005 applied a new definition to the “realignment” phase of the 
process.43 Where in previous rounds realignment applied mainly to the movement and 
consolidation of capabilities at a small degree, with very little movement or exchange of 
mass troop movement on a large scale, BRAC 2005 took realignment to a new level 
altogether.  As the 2005 BRAC Commission stated in its final report to the President on  
8 Sep 2005: 
  
                                                
43 2005 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission Report to the President, Washington, DC, 
September 8, 2005, p.13. 
 
21 
 
Prior BRAC rounds occurred at the dusk of the Cold War, when military budgets 
and force structure were shrinking. The 2005 BRAC round occurred in a post-
9/11 environment with our armed forces deployed in combat in Iraq and 
Afghanistan with stable or increasing force structure and defense budgets. During
the 2005 BRAC implementation period, the armed forces expect to relocate 
70,000 service members from overseas to installations within the United States.
Prior BRAC rounds took place in the context of military doctrine and force 
structure shaped by the Cold War. The 2005 BRAC round occurred during the 
transformation of military doctrine and force structure to meet the needs of an 
entirely new threat and security environment.44  
In his own guidance to the DoD Staff with respect to the 2005 BRAC process,  
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld provided clear guidance on the transformational  
nature of this BRAC round, stating that this round of recommendations would serve to  
align                                                                                                                                  
U.S. base structure with the force structure that is expected to be needed over the
next 20 years.  These proposals will implement the Department’s global force 
reposturing; facilitate the ongoing transformation of U.S. forces to meet the 
challenges of the 21st century; and restructure important support functions to 
capitalize on advances in technology and business practices.  The Department’s 
BRAC recommendations address almost every Defense mission area and affect 
most of the Department’s major U.S. installations.  Overall, these 
recommendations support force transformation; address new threats, strategies 
and force protection concerns; consolidate business-oriented support functions; 
promote joint- and multi-service basing; and provide significant savings.45 
Furthermore, in his testimony before the Subcommittee on Military Construction  
of the House Appropriations Committee on 22 April 2009, the Deputy Undersecretary of  
Defense (Installations & Environment), Wayne Arny, underscored the significance of the  
2005 round of BRAC, saying:  
  
                                                
44 2005 BRAC Commission, 2005 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission Report to the 
President, Washington, DC, September 8, 2005.p.8. 
45 Rumsfeld introductory letter to the Chairman of the 2005 BRAC Commission, 13 May 2005,  pp. 1-2. 
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Beyond the comparative size, it is important to note that BRAC 2005 is the most 
complex round ever. This complexity is not merely a function of its magnitude, 
but is, to the largest extent, a function of the original goal established for this 
round: that BRAC 2005 would focus on the reconfiguration of operational 
capacity to maximize war fighting capability and efficiency. Focusing on 
operational capacity required that we appropriately assess the increased military 
capabilities we are achieving through these recommendations.46 
Based on this vision by the Secretary of Defense and his subordinates, a major 
component of the 2005 BRAC process entailed the joining of existing bases-- Army, Air 
Force, and Navy-- and combining them to form larger, “super bases” which contained all 
the elements of the joint service components.  Joint basing calls for installations that 
share a common boundary or are in close proximity to consolidate installation 
management functions and the delivery of installations support functions, while 
considering best business practices and ensuring war fighting capabilities are preserved 
or enhanced.47  The earliest example of this “super base” is Joint Base McGuire-Dix-
Lakehurst, formed underneath one controlling headquarters out of McGuire Air Force 
Base, Fort Dix, and Lakehurst Naval Air Station.  As a result of the 2005 BRAC process, 
eleven other joint bases are being formed across the country (see Table 4), and are 
required, by law, to be operational no later than 15 September 2011.48                                                                                                                      
 
  
                                                
46 Wayne Arny, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations & Environment), Testimony before the 
Subcommittee on Military Construction of the House Appropriations Committee, 22 April 2009. 
47 Arny, 22 April 2009. 
48 Ibid. 
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Table 4: Joint Base Plan in 2005 BRAC Recommendations  
Base Installations Affected State Service Lead
Joint Base Anacostia Bolling AFB and Washington Navy Yard DC Navy
Joint Base Andrews Andrew AFB and Naval Air Facility Washingto MD Air Force
Joint Base Bragg Fort Bragg and Pope AFB NC Army
Joint Base Charleston Naval WS Charleston and Charleston AFB SC Air Force
Joint Base Elmendorf Fort Richardson and Elmendorf AFB AK Air Force
Joint Base Lackland Fort Sam Houston, Randolph AFB, Lackland AFB TX Air Force
Joint Base Langley Fort Eustis and Langley AFB VA Air Force
Joint Base Lewis McChord AFB and Fort Lewis WA Army
Joint Base Little Creek Naval Station Norfolk and Fort Story VA Navy
Joint Base McGuire Naval AES Lakehurst, Fort Dix, McGuire AFB NJ Air Force
Joint Base Myer Fort Myer and Henderson Hall VA Army
Joint Base Pearl Harbor Hickam AFB and Naval Station Pearl Harbor HI Navy
 
Despite a continued focus on overseas deployments and a change in Secretary of 
Defense from Donald Rumsfeld to Robert Gates, a focus on the Department of Defense’s 
transformation effort continues to be the closure on overseas bases and the return of 
overseas forces to the continental United States.  This effort will require full analysis of 
space availability at installations, and forecasts of not only what will be needed for the 
current force structures, but also for force structures that involve units and weapons 
systems still in the design process. In forming the Army’s Installation Ma agement 
Agency (IMA) and the Navy’s Commander, Naval Installations (CNI), regional offices 
were established to coordinate the activities of installations within the regions and to 
determine where analysis indicates efficiencies of any kind can be generated by 
combining regional operational and logistical functions.49  In addition, the  increased use 
of National Guard and Reserve components during combat operations in both Iraq and 
Afghanistan has pointed out the close links between the installation needs of the Guard 
and Reserve and the active force, and has thus opened the question of how best to provide 
                                                
49 Congressional Research Service Report, 18 October 2008, pp. 12-13. 
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support for these units in the future.  Most recently, the 2009 Defense Authorization Act 
contained a clause in which the BRAC Commission would be dissolved upon the 
completion of the current BRAC round (presumably in 2011).  As there is substantial 
evidence which indicates that the forced closure of military bases across the country 
rarely occurred before the evolution of the BRAC Commission in 1988, this law may 
very well be over-written before it is ever enacted. 
2.2 The Intrinsic Value of Military Bases 
Assessing the true “value” of a military base is nearly impossible.  Gaining an 
appreciation for the sheer size and magnitude of the land that the Department of Defense 
controls around the United States, however, is crucial to understanding the true scope of 
the BRAC problem as it relates to determining the effect of the BRAC process on home 
prices in the local communities surrounding military bases.  According to the most 
recently available estimates from the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations & 
Environment), found in the FY2008 DoD Base Structure Plan, “The Department of 
Defense… remains one of the world’s largest ‘landlords,’ with a physical plant consisting 
of more than 545,900 facilities (buildings, structures and linear structures), located on 
more than 5,400 sites, on approximately 30 million acres.”50 As Figure 1 depicts, there 
are major installations from the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps in almost 
every state in the continental United States, as well as several other large bases in both 
Alaska and Hawaii: 
 
  
                                                
50 Department of Defense Base Structure Plan for FY2008, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense 
(Installations & Environment), 30 September 2007, p. 2. 
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Figure 1: Department of Defense Installations in the Continental United States 
 
 
 In addition, as Tables 5 – 8 clearly demonstrate, the size of the land that the 
Department of Defense occupies on installations within the United States, its t rritories, 
and around the world, the sheer number of buildings on these installations, and the plant 
replacement value for these facilities, is truly awesome.  There are 4,584 military bases in 
the United States, 104 more in U.S. territories, and 761 overseas, for a total of 5,429 
installations world-wide.  These bases occupy a total of 32.41 million acres around the 
globe, and the plant replacement value for the buildings which they house is a staggering 
$706.31 billion.   
Army Navy Air Force Marines
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Table 5: Worldwide U.S. Military Installations51  
Area Army Navy Air Force Marine Corps White House Total
United States 1,884 955 1,581 130 14 4,584
U.S. Territories 27 57 19 1 0 104
Overseas 327 149 259 26 0 761
Total 2,238 1,161 1,859 157 14 5,429
 
Table 6: Total Acreage of U.S. Installations (in millions of acres)52 
 
Acreage Army Navy Air Force Marine Corps White House Total
Total 18.07 2.14 9.85 2.35 > 0.01 32.41 
 
Table 7: Total Buildings and Structures on DoD Installations53 
 
Type of Asset Army Navy Air Force Marine Corps White House Total
Buildings 143,035 66,151 81,970 24,886 196 316,238
Structures 71,315 39,676 56,329 14,043 228 181,591
Linear Structures 21,254 8,247 16,699 1,630 55 47,885
Total 235,604 114,074 154,998 40,559 479 545,714 
 
Table 8: Plant Replacement Value for DoD Installations ($Billions)54 
 
Type of Asset Army Navy Air Force Marine Corps White House Total
Buildings $177.28 $107.17 $135.87 $31.36 $3.72 $455.40
Structures $41.20 $65.54 $65.54 $10.80 $0.06 $162.22
Linear Structures $35.92 $27.87 $27.87 $4.49 $0.03 $88.69
Total $172.16 $229.29 $229.29 $46.66 $3.81 $706.31 
 
  
  
                                                
51 Ibid., p.6. 
52 Ibid., p. 6. 
53 Ibid., p.8. 
54 Ibid. 
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Consider the state of North Carolina alone.  Within the state, there are 6 major 
military bases (as previously defined, those bases having a plant replacement valu  of 
greater than $888 million) and 108 minor bases.  The military owns or leases a total of 
1,727,673 acres of land to maintain these bases.  This amounts to 5.7% of the total 
acreage of the state of North Carolina.  In addition, the military employs 118,231 service 
members and 25,969 civilians and contract employees on these bases.  In the case of Fort 
Bragg, the largest military base in the state, 47,831 Soldiers are stationed on post, and 
over 15,000 civilians and contract employees work on the base.  It is estimated that 
roughly 70% (or nearly 34,000) of the Soldiers who work on Fort Bragg live in homes off 
base.  Thus, when combined with the civilian and contract employees who work on base, 
Fort Bragg accounts for nearly 59,000 personnel, in a city with a population of roughly 
168,000, or over 35% of the population of Fayetteville. 55 
Other than sheer size, there are other tangible characteristics that make military 
bases so lucrative and valuable to the community.  First, in many cases, the bases are 
themselves self-contained communities, containing their own schools, hospitals, 
shopping centers, lakes and recreation facilities, water and sewage treatment plants, and 
power plants.  Most larger military bases have their own mature transportation nodes-- 
road networks, easy access to interstate systems, rail lines, and bus terminals.  Nearly all 
Air Force bases and many large Army bases have their own runways and air traffic 
control facilities, and most of these runways are capable of landing any aircraft in the 
world.  And, finally, most Naval bases have their own mature port facility, capable of 
facilitating the embarkation and debarkation of the largest ships in the world. 
                                                
55 2008 DoD Base Structure Report, pp. 62-63. 
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 Of course, there are plenty of features which make military bases less than 
desirable to the local community, as well.  Most Army posts are in remote, rural 
locations, away from large metropolitan areas.  Most bases were constructed in the 
periods between the First and Second World Wars; infrastructure is aging and is in much 
need of an upgrade to the twenty-first century.  Though much progress has been made to 
abate this during the past ten years, environmental hazards still abound on most military 
installations, the result of years of fuel spills and leaky vehicles and aircraft.  Most large 
military bases also contain their own live ammunition training areas, and decades and 
decades of unexploded ordnance undoubtedly lies on the ground in areas where humans 
have not trod in nearly 100 years.  Finally, as military installations are thei  own self-
contained communities, they have never been zoned for commercial or residential 
building purposes. 
2.3 The Way Ahead – BRAC 2014 
 
 There were strong objections among the 2005 BRAC Commission as to the 
manner in which the 2005 BRAC round was executed by the Department of Defense, as 
well as the degree to which the Commission believed it was not able to properly execute 
its mandated duties and responsibilities.  As such, in Appendix R to the final Commission 
report to the President on 8 September 2005, the Commission recommended the 
following actions for the future:56 
(1) Extend the life cycle of the BRAC Commission in order to ensure that the  
recommendations made by the Commission and approved by the President are actually 
carried out;  
  
                                                
562005 BRAC Commission Report, 8 May 2005, Appendix R, pp. R8 – R14.  
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(2) Create a public “corporation” that has the legal authority to finance the  
transfer of closed military bases to the private sector; 
 (3) Conduct the next BRAC round in 2014-2015; do not begin the formal BRAC 
process until the issuance of a formal threat assessment by the Director of National 
Intelligence and the formal release of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR); 
 (4) Require the Secretary of Defense to release the “certifying data” which 
supports the DoD’s BRAC recommendations no later than seven days of forwarding the 
DoD BRAC recommendations to the Commission; 
 (5) Extend the time period in which the Commission must make its 
recommendations to the President from four months to not more than seven  months. 
 (6) Grant subpoena power to the Commission so that it may independently 
subpoena witnesses to testify at its hearings and require the delivery of supporting 
documentation by those testifying before it. 
These recommendations were included in a legislative proposal to attempt to get 
the current BRAC law updated.  Thus, while it will be the responsibility of the President 
in 2014 to determine whether a new round of BRAC is required, the Secretary of Defense 
will set the conditions required to both implement these required changes as well as to 
provide the impetus behind another round of base closings.57 
Considering all of this data and criteria as a whole, however, it seems clear that 
military installations-- in particular the large category Army posts, Naval stations, Air 
Force bases, and Marine Corps camps and air stations that are so much of the prevailing 
landscape across the United States -- contribute a great deal to the local communities in 
                                                
57 Since base closings are normally seen as having a ne tive net economic effect on the local community, 
rarely, if ever, would Congress provide this impetus to push for another round of BRAC.  
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the way of employment opportunities, retail sales and local sales tax, and property tax 
contributions.  Thus, when a major base shuts down as a result of the Base Realignment 
and Closure process, there is also a clear economic impact and effect on the local 
community.  The process itself, though not perfect, has evolved over time in such a 
manner as to at least provide some degree of predictability to the communities tha  it 
directly effects.  The degree to which that process affects the value of residential real 
estate in these communities is, therefore, a vitally important issue to both these 
communities and to the individual services within the Department of Defense.     
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CHAPTER 3: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
 As this paper attempts to answer the question of what effect the Department of 
Defense Base Realignment and Closure process has on the value of residential property
in the surrounding community, I combined the classic components of an event study with 
hedonic pricing models in real estate.  As such, a thorough understanding of all three 
aspects of this project is critical to understanding the problem: academic lit rature on the 
economic impacts of the BRAC process, hedonic pricing models, and event study 
methodology. 
3.1 BRAC – related Literature 
 
Despite concerns about the effects of base closure, policymakers have little 
information to guide their assessments of which communities might need special 
assistance and what specific types of assistance to provide.  What little cad mic work 
has been done on the BRAC process has had a narrow economic focus and has been 
confined to a narrow geographic region of the United States, as well.  There was a flurry 
of BRAC-related literature in the early nineties that focused on the early BRAC rounds 
(1988, 1991, and 1993), but as the contentiousness of the process slowly faded away, so 
did the academic studies.  This is also due to the fact that there was an entire decad  
between BRAC 1995 and BRAC 2005: nobody, it seemed, wanted to re-visit the BRAC 
issues of the late eighties and early nineties, and neither was anyone interested in 
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analyzing the round of BRAC 1995 (which was far smaller, in terms of recommended 
closures and realignments, than BRAC 1993). 
Innes, et. al. (1994),  Bradshaw (1994), Dardia (1996), Hooker and Knetter 
(2001), and Poppert and Hertzog (2003) all studied BRAC through the prism of the 
economic effect on the local community, and all three studies confine their analysis to 
this effect in the communities surrounding several Army and Air Force bases in 
California.  There is a logical explanation for this, as through the first four rounds of 
BRAC, nearly 23% of all base closures occurred in California, and California’s 22 base 
closures was nearly as many as the next four highest states combined (Texas – 8, 
Pennsylvania – 6; Illinois – 5; New York – 5).  These studies provide results in two 
specific areas: (1) the long-term impact of earlier rounds of closures and (2) projections 
of the effects of the recent round of closures. Each tends to produce a somewhat different 
picture of base closure effects.58 
Studies of earlier base closures are generally optimistic about the capacity of a 
community to recover economically from the closure of a military base in its close 
proximity.  For example, Daicoff et al. (1970) found little economic effect on the 
community when the employment loss is less than 5 percent of total area employment. 
Both they and MacKinnon (1978) found no net loss in employment, although there may 
be some loss of high-wage jobs. Interesting enough, both studies emphasize that the 
major effect is felt in housing markets, though neither study attempts to analyze this 
effect in any detail with any sort of empirical data or results.  The most extensive study of 
the long-term effects of base closures (Dardia, 1996), found that over the longer term, 
                                                
58 Michael Dardia, et. al., “The Effect of Military Base Closures on Local Communities: A Short Term 
Perspective,” Rand: National Defense Research Institute, 1996, p. 25. 
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post-closure employment tends to surpass pre-closure levels.  Jointly, all of these s udies 
call attention to several factors that should be kept in mind when considering the effects
of base closures on local communities. First, the overall level of economic growth in the 
area (as well as the nation) will condition the effects of base closure.  Second, the transfer 
of civilian personnel and the employed spouses of military personnel can create 
substantial job openings for local residents. Third, many of the bases are not closely
integrated into their local communities; thus, the loss of base personnel does not 
necessarily translate into sharp reductions in retail sales to local business. Finally, reuse 
of bases provides communities with new economic opportunities that can become sources 
of employment and earnings. In sum, these studies suggest that over the longer term, the 
vast majority of communities tend to recover and often improve on their pre-closure 
economies. 
Because Dardia (1996) used findings that are based on a limited sample of a few 
different types of communities in a limited geographic locale, these results cannot 
necessarily be applied automatically to communities in other regions of the country. The 
results do suggest, however, that the impacts of base closures are likely to be more 
modest than initial estimates that do not attempt to consider offsetting economic activity. 
Close analysis of such local economic variables as off-base employment of mili ary 
families, the size and spending patterns of local military retirees, and growth trends in 
population and economic sectors could provide a more accurate picture of what is likely 
to occur after a major military base in a local community is closed. 
Hooker and Knetter (2001) studied the economic effect of employment and the 
personal income effects that occurred as a result of the BRAC process.  They detail the 
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reduction in defense spending from 1986 to 1998 and the need for greater action on base 
closure; however, they also provide evidence for the difficulties in executing the base 
closure process, in particular, how to actually select the right bases for closure.  The 
single most important factor in looking at BRAC, as discussed in the previous studies, is 
the economic effect that closing a base has on the local community.  Hooker and Knetter 
approached the problem using a newly constructed dataset to study the employment and 
personal income effects at the county level.  They explained that military bases are a 
major employer of most counties in which the base is located (up to 30% in some cases, 
according to the study) and thereby accounted for a larger share of income and tax
revenues in the area.  Thus, the transfer of payment-related income played a vital role n 
the economic stability of the local community. 
These results, however, contradict the results of Dardia (1996) in nearly every 
way.  Why is this so?  Dardia (1996) looked only at bases in California, bases that 
retrospectively occupied prime areas of real estate among one of the most lucrative 
residential and commercial real estate market in the country.  This was not thecase with 
the majority of the bases used in the database for the Hooker and Knetter (2001) study.  
Though they did include bases in California, they also included other bases across the 
nation that closed down between 1971 and 1998.  The vast majority of these bases were 
larger bases in more rural type communities.  When the bases in Dardia (1996) were 
marked for closure, it was clear that the effect to the community was much less than the 
effect of the normal base closure across the rest of the United States, due mostly to the 
simple value of land in California compared to other parts of the country. 
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Hooker and Knetter (2001) also demonstrated that government transfer payments 
helped pay for certain activities within the local communities effected by base closure, 
especially in the operation and maintenance of the local communities’ infrastructure and 
services.  Normally, local taxes (i.e., property taxes and sales tax) are utilized in 
education, road maintenance and upkeep, parks services and recreation, community 
development, etc.  The importance of the transfer payment differs in one major aspect: 
the federal government (in the form of property taxes, sales tax, and other taxes owed to 
the local community government) pays the taxes for the operation and maintenance of the 
base.  Taxes collected by the local civilian government (again, property taxes, sales tax, 
and any state income tax that exists) normally pay for the operation, maintenance, and 
service-related functions (i.e., garbage collection, etc.) of the local community.  Thus, 
counties which include a military base within their boundaries enjoy the luxury of 
receiving additional tax support from the federal government, and it is normally in the
best interest of the local community government to keep these bases from closing down. 
Hooker and Knetter (2001) also draw out a very important point with respect to 
BRAC and the local community: the opportunity cost of the resources the base affords
the community after it is closed.  These tangible assets, which make a military base so 
intrinsically valuable, are quantified by the Department of Defense by the plant 
replacement value (PRV) of the base.  In particular, Hooker and Knetter cited the 
available land that the community received and the possible use of the land after it is 
released to the community as the most important consideration affecting a community as 
the result of a potential base closure.  Hooker and Knetter give us two examples of 
scenarios that can assist the recovery of local economies after the bases closes; both of 
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these scenarios relate to bases in California (the Presidio of San Francisco Army base and 
Moffett Field Naval Air Station in Silicon Valley), and both lend credence to the results 
of the Rand study.  Both of these examples use employment and personal income 
indicators in their study, and compare responses from local communities to other 
counterfactual scenarios.   
The first scenario assumed that the county’s employment and per capita personal 
income growth rate was equal to the state’s growth rate.  The second scenario assumed 
that the difference between the county (and thus the base) and the state’s growth rate in 
the years preceding the date of the base closure would continue long after the base closed 
down.  The results of their research demonstrated that off-base employment grew faster 
in communities marked for closure than it did in the counterfactual model.  The study 
thus proved that the spillover from job loss on bases did not necessarily affect the 
surrounding communities, as was shown from the results of their earlier impact analysis.  
They also showed that if the resources from a base are properly used in alternative ways 
following the closure of the base, then an increase of job creation could actually occur if 
industries with higher multiplier effects are brought in to substitute for jobs when the 
base closes down. 
The personal income results from Hooker and Knetter’s study also revealed very 
little impact from the closure of a base through the BRAC process, that is, there was no 
statistically significant impact on per capita income in a community once a base closed 
down.  Hooker and Knetter give us two possible explanations for this result: (1) generally 
speaking, military personnel working on a base have below-average income when 
compared to the income of their peers working in similar sectors off-base; and (2) the 
37 
 
older and more experienced civilian employees working on base who lose their jobs tend 
to find new employment at higher salaries once the base has closed down.  Hooker and 
Knetter contend, and my own research concurs, that most economic impact reports have 
traditionally used projected data on income loss instead of more accurate measurements.  
Hooker and Knetter argue that projections from input-output models tend to ignore the 
capacity of regional economies to adjust to base closure in order to lessen its overall 
impact on the local economy.  They further argue that the primary factor hampering 
accurate economic impact studies is the estimation of the impacts that would occur 
without base closure; these are normally grossly overblown. 
The type of the base itself is another key factor that Hooker and Knetter highlig t 
in their discussion of the ability of local communities to weather base closures.  Bases 
that require more highly skilled workers, utilize more methods of transportation for 
shipping and receiving supplies, personnel, and equipment (i.e., via air, land, rail and 
sea), and provide more resources for future development tend to assist the local 
community once it is closed down.  This makes perfect sense, and is the primary reason 
that Air Forces bases with active runways and air traffic control facilities, and Naval 
bases with mature port facilities are much less prone to feel a negative impact of a base 
closure than is an Army post in a rural community without access to any major 
transportation hubs. 
Hooker and Knetter conclude their study by recommending that any future studies 
on the economic impact of BRAC-related base closures should attempt to gain specific, 
measured results rather than simply projecting the results of some obscure economic 
impact study.  They also emphasize the importance of refuting the negative impacts of 
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base closure that most of the studies predict, and instead concentrate on highlighting the 
positive aspects of base closure that can occur in a local community with insightful, 
detailed, and well-developed planning on the proper use of the base’s resources once it is 
closed down. 
Hawkins (2005) assesses the impact of military bases on local economic-growth 
rates in three distinct metropolitan statistical areas, Jacksonville Naval Air Station, 
Mayport Naval Station, both located in Jacksonville, Florida; and MacDill Air Force 
Base, located in Tampa, Florida. He examined the extent to which proximity to a 
military-base or the Central Business District (CBD) affects local e onomic growth rates 
and the degree to which variability in growth is explained by the distance to a base.  
Using spatial analysis and multiple regression analysis, he attempts to analyze the impact 
on the economic growth rates of the localized areas from each of the three military bases 
at the 95% confidence level. His research hypothesis is that military bases have a
discernible impact on economic growth rates at a geographical scale because of proximal 
distances and accessibility along transportation corridors between the base and major 
commercial and financial nodes at the 95% confidence level.  His results showed 
discernible impact on the economic growth rates of the study areas; however, the cause of 
economic growth is not discernible among impact from the base, commercial nodes,
economic nodes, demographics, distance variables and accessibility variables in the tudy 
areas. Regression analyses revealed possible positive and negative causes for economic-
growth rates of the study areas.  
Though Hawkins did not look at the direct effect of the proximity of homes to 
these three bases, his approach is very similar to the one I use in this study.  In his 
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conclusions, Hawkins recommends that any future study on the economic impact of 
BRAC should consider the following important criteria: 
(1) do not predict; rather, estimate the impact of BRAC on economic growth 
resulting from base closures using viable econometric and statistical models; 
(2) include distance variables and accessibility to local transportation nodes and 
corridors; 
(3) consider the percentage of total population that is employed at the base in 
question; 
(4) research should consider using a smaller geographical scale to estimate the 
impacts at local levels; 
(5) include a large number of social and economic independent variables to 
increase the variability and random pattern of the model; and 
(6) apply the criteria for base closure as it is defined by the Department of 
Defense.59  
Local communities have commissioned their own studies on the effect of BRAC, 
as well.  A study completed by the city of Huntsville, Alabama following the 2005 
BRAC announcement is typical of these reports.  In the report, the city analyzes the 
additional revenue that the city will gain through population growth (Redstone Arsenal, 
in the city of Huntsville, is scheduled to gain an additional 1,655 military employees as a 
result of the 2005 BRAC process) in the way of increased income tax, sales tax, and fuel
tax, and the requirements for transportation infrastructure upgrades and improvements.  
The study includes neither discussion nor analysis at all of the impact of BRAC as it 
                                                
59 Hawkins, pp. 33-34. 
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relates to the value of real estate in Madison County or the city of Huntsville.60  A report 
commissioned for the county by the Haas Center for Business Research and Economic 
Development at the University of West Florida in July 2007 does provide a cursory 
analysis of the impact of BRAC (like Redstone Arsenal, the region is scheduled to gain 
approximately 5,000 military employees as a result on enhanced activities at Eglin Air 
Force Base and Naval Air Station Pensacola) with respect to housing.  However, th  
focus of this analysis is primarily on the increased amount of affordable housing required 
as a result of military families relocating to the region, and does not analyze the impact at 
all on housing prices in the region itself.61 
  Frieden and Baxter (2000) provide valuable data on the economic challenges of 
base closures in a study commissioned by the Economic Development Administration of 
the U. S. Department of Commerce.  Though they tell us nothing about the value of real 
estate as a result of base closures, they detail the problems posed by managing real estate 
development on military bases following their closure, including: environmental 
contamination, substandard infrastructure, uncertainty about the future development f 
particular parcels and buildings, and uncertainty about property conveyance.   
Environmental contamination is typical, as at obsolete industrial sites, and may 
take several years to remedy. Meanwhile, federal regulations prevent conveyance of most 
contaminated sites to new owners, delaying redevelopment of the base. The military
services take responsibility for cleanup and its costs, but progress is often slw.  With 
                                                
60 City of Huntsville, Alabama. “Economic & Transportation Impact of BRAC on Huntsville and Madison 
County,” 2005, pp 2-3. 
 
61 Harper, Rick.  “Economic Impact of Military Personnel Realignments in Okaloosa County.” Haas Center 
for Business Research and Economic Development, University of West Florida, July 2007, pp.1-4. 
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respect to substandard infrastructure and buildings, when many bases were constructed 
before or during the Second World War, federal sites were not subject to state or local 
building codes. Many roads, utility lines, and electrical systems do not come up to code 
standards or to the more demanding commercial standards for real estate developm nt. 
Many buildings do not comply with standards of the Americans with Disabilities Act.  
Federal aid is available to pay part of the cost of bringing infrastructure up to standard, 
but the cost far exceeds federal assistance. So, finding the upfront money for 
infrastructure improvement is a major problem.  Uncertainty about the future 
development of particular parcels of land abounds, as during the early years after a 
closing decision, the future use of specific properties is unknown and usually 
unknowable.  As a result, potential investors cannot be sure what will be across the street 
from their property on land that is not yet zoned and does not yet have public services.   
Among public services, the case of electricity illustrates the problem: service 
providers do not want to risk investing funds in locations where there are no customers, 
and business firms do not want to locate plants in places without an assured supply of 
electricity.  Finally, there exists great uncertainty about property conveyance, as local 
communities do not know at the outset which base property may be available to them, 
and on what terms. In the early stages of base reuse, property is screened for possible 
transfer to other federal agencies, state and local governments, and providers f hou ing 
and services for homeless people before it becomes available for economic development. 
During the screening process, which usually goes on for several months, the community 
is unable to make firm plans for base reuse, while other organizations with higher priority
carve out sites they consider useful. In the process, the base could be converted from a 
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large property in single ownership into a checkerboard of parcels selected for their 
attractiveness to an assortment of potential users. 
In order to assist communities adjacent to installations approved for closure or 
realignment, the Department of Defense created the Office of Economic Assistance 
(OEA) in 2000.  In the introduction to its informational pamphlet designed to assist 
communities in the midst of base closure planning, the OEA says it serves as the 
Department of Defense’s 
primary source for assisting communities that are adversely impacted by Defense 
program changes, including base closures or realignments, base expansions, and 
contract or program cancellations. OEA offers technical and financial assist nce 
to adversely impacted communities, and coordinates the involvement of other 
Federal Agencies through the Defense Economic Adjustment Program and the 
President's Economic Adjustment Committee.62 
 
In coordination with another DoD entity created to assist in BRAC-related transitions, the 
President’s Economic Adjustment Committee, the OEA works closely with Local Re-use 
Authorities (LRAs) to assist in everything from micro and macro-level economic 
planning to land-use planning to the proper use of military training areas.  It is also the 
sole approval authority at the U.S. government level for the granting of business entitie  
as LRAs, organizations which go a long way to ensuring the future success of 
communities after the military has shut the gates permanently on a base. 
 The significance of the OEA and the LRAs is that research has shown that 
communities that have prepared for BRAC through a the early formation of an LRA to 
govern their post-closure economic growth and development have generally been able to 
overcome any negative effects of the BRAC process much quicker and more readily than 
                                                
62 United States Department of Defense.  Office of Economic Assistance.  “Responding to Change: 
Communities and BRAC.”  Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, December 2005. 
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communities that have not prepared and formed an LRA.  Reese Air Force Base, one of 
the two installations that I analyze in this study, is a great example of this.  Early on in 
the process, the BRAC process was predicted by the city and county of Lubbock, Texas 
to be devastating for the surrounding community.  Various articles ran in the local 
community newspaper, the Lubbock Avalanche-Journal, predicting both public 
dissatisfaction with the BRAC selection process, as well as economic doom for the city 
of Lubbock.63  The biggest reason for this, it was initially predicted, was the existence of 
a regional airport in Lubbock that pre-dated the announcement of Reese’s demise through 
BRAC.  Since there would obviously be no opportunity to capitalize on Reese’s major 
function as an active airfield (with a runway capable of facilitating the largest of 
commercial aircraft), the community feared that Reese would be a 2,500-acre se mless 
void, immediately release over 1,200 unemployed workers into an already uncertain job 
market, and be an overall negative drain on the Lubbock economy. 
Twelve years later, however, the Reese Technology Center, formerly known as 
Reese Air Force Base, is touted as a major BRAC “success story” by both the 
Department of Defense and the city of Lubbock.  The bio-technology park is the home to 
cutting-edge research efforts; Plains College, a two-year associate degree school with an 
active enrollment of 3,000 students; and three commercial technology companies . Texa
Tech University has also built three new research facilities at Reese, the most notable of 
which is the Texas Tech Institute of Environmental and Human Health.  Job creation 
since BRAC has long wiped away any losses incurred through the closure of Rese AFB, 
                                                
63 “More Reese AFB support staff leave,” Lubbock Avalanche-Journal, Lubbock, Texas, 30 June 1997, p. 
1. 
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and the Reese Technology Center is now the center of a major regional economic boom 
in northwestern Texas and eastern New Mexico.64 
Complementing this list of existing literature, the Congressional Research Service 
(CRS) published four major studies on the BRAC process over the course of the past four 
years.  However, the overwhelming focus of each of these studies was in two 
predominant areas: the environmental impacts of base closures and the economic impact 
on communities with respect to unemployment and the loss of retail sales.  The report by 
the Department of Defense itself on the economic impact of BRAC details only the 
number of military and civilian workers potentially displaced by the realignment and 
closure process, without regard for the present value or future viability of the land being 
turned over to the state.  Indeed, the Department of Defense itself, in the official 2005 
BRAC report to the President and Congress, defines the Total Economic Impact of 
BRAC as “An aggregation of economic effects or impact of a BRAC action on a 
particular installation. It includes both direct and indirect job changes, expressed as a 
percent of the total employment in the economic area.”65  This impact is further defined, 
in net job gains or losses, in Appendix O of the report.  
Two recent papers unrelated to the BRAC process that nonetheless provide great 
insight into the real estate price event study model are Ready and Ready (1995) and 
Dehring, Depken, and Ward (2007).  Ready and Ready (1995) execute an event study in 
order to determine the effect of landfill announcements on residential property values in 
the surrounding communities.  In many ways this is an event study in nature similar to 
my own, whereby the announcement of the placement of a landfill is analogous to the 
                                                
64 “Base Re-Use Success Stories,” Office of Economic Adjustment, United States Department of Defense, 
January 2005, p.6. 
65 Department of Defense 2005 BRAC Report, 12 May 2005, p. 5. 
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BRAC closure announcement in my own study.  Ready and Ready also show that there is 
an optimal “tipping fee” that occurs immediately after a new landfill is built, which, in 
turn, has a significant effect on the value of property in counties adjacent to the landfill.  
In it applicable to my own research, as well, in that the model Ready and Ready emplo
in their analysis is well-suited to landfills in particular, as there is normally a great deal of 
time between construction of subsequent landfills in a particular county.  
Dehring, Depken and Ward (DDW) study the impact of announcements for the 
potential site of the Dallas Cowboys’ new stadium on the value of residential property in 
the possible counties that the stadium may go.  They use a similar methodology to Tu 
(2005), who compared the values of residential property within a three-mile radius of the 
Washington Redskin’s new FedEx Field at three distinct periods of time: the “pre-
development” phase (i.e., before the site for the stadium was selected), the 
“development” phase (the period in between site selection and completion of work on the 
stadium), and the “post development” phase (after the stadium was completed and 
operational).  Though their results are not at all similar to Tu’s, they nonetheless employ 
a very similar mindset in executing their own research. Also, as Tu looked at the v lue of 
residential real estate in the aggregate at these distinct points in time, DDW instead look 
at the effects of specific stadium announcement on the value of real estate in the 
surrounding areas.   
DDW study the effects of five distinct announcements in two separate 
geographical areas, the cities of Dallas and Arlington, Texas.  As opposed to my own 
study in which the BRAC process follows a process and timeline mandated by law, their 
five announcements correspond to the dates in which county officials (in Dallas) 
46 
 
announced the potential or probability of the stadium coming to their city and then, forty 
days later, announce that negotiations have broken down and the stadium will not be 
built; and as in the case of Arlington, the three announcements correspond to the: (1) dat 
that the mayor announced he had been in secret negotiations with the Dallas Cowboys t 
build a publicly-subsidized stadium in Arlington, (2) date that the Arlington City Council 
approved a voting ballot referendum to put the issue to a public vote, and (3) actual date 
of the public vote in which the public approved the stadium and the incursion of a new 
tax to fund its construction.  
As with my own study of the effect of the different BRAC announcements on 
residential property values, it was impossible for DDW to incorporate actual daily 
changes in the value of a single house (much as a “normal” event study might to track 
daily changes in stock prices during an event study window).  Along the same lines, and 
again differing from accepted event-study methodology, DDW cannot calculate any sort 
of relative return in the housing market, in the way that event studies utilize the stock’s 
abnormal return to determine the effects of a particular event over time.  Thus, they are 
confident that the price effect on residential property values resulting from one of their 
five stadium announcements will be accurately reflected in the value of the property at 
the time.  
Finally, DDW use a difference-in-difference identification strategy to calculate 
the effects of the stadium announcements. They do this by employing different dummy 
variables to account for both the date of the particular announcement, the county in which 
the announcement occurs, and a dummy variable which is an interaction between the 
county and the post-announcement effect.  This, they postulate, will provide a similar
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effect to calculating the actual effect of increased taxation as a result of the future 
stadium. 
Because of the methodology that DDW employ in their study, that is, combining 
hedonic pricing models in an event-study model that also accounts for difference-in-
difference estimators within their sample, I have chosen to replicate many aspects of their 
regression model and research methodology in this study.  Thus, as DDW measure the 
effects of the stadium announcement on residential property values, I measure the eff cts 
of BRAC closure announcements on the value of residential property in a very similar 
way.  I am also utilizing many of the same analytical tools that DDW have used, as they 
have proven to be an invaluable resource into the potential empirical results of my own 
study. 
 One area that DDW do not address in their study is the existence and 
effectiveness of a communication plan with respect to the stadium announcements in both 
the city of Arlington and Dallas County.  As they showed an initial  negative effect on 
home values with the stadium announcements, it would have been interesting to delve 
into the strategic communication plan employed by both county and city governments as 
they attempted to land the site approval for the stadium.  The manner in which the 
stadium announcements were executed publicly may very well have had some sort of 
effect, negative or positive, on how residential real estate prices were perceived and thus 
incorporated into the local real estate markets.   
 Both the Department of Defense and the BRAC Commission, on the other hand, 
seem to have a detailed and well thought out communication plan with respect to their 
announcement of their respective BRAC closure plans.  Unlike the announcements in the 
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DDW stadium study (except for the final announcement of the results of the public 
referendum, which was known well ahead of time, though the results of the vote were 
seemingly always in doubt until the final “announcement” at the end of Voting Day), the 
dates for the announcement and publishing of the BRAC lists are both mandated by law 
and published well ahead of time.  Though there is certainly the distinct possibility of 
insider information and leaks within both the Department of Defense and the BRAC 
Commission ahead of the official announcements, the date of the announcement is no 
surprise to anyone. 
3.2 Hedonic Pricing Literature  
The hedonic pricing method is a simple, basic technique in which housing sales 
can be decomposed into measurable prices and quantities, so that the prices for different
houses or for similar houses in different markets can be predicted and compared. In its 
simplest form, a hedonic equation is a regression of housing values on housing 
characteristics.66 The independent variables represent the individual characteristics of the 
house, and the regression coefficients may be transferred into estimates of the implicit 
prices of these characteristics. Hedonic regressions are basically regressions of home 
values against characteristics of the unit that determine that value. The hedonic r gression 
assumes that we know the basic determinants of a home’s value:67 
             V = f (S, N, L, T)          (1) 
where 
                                                
66 Stephen Malpezzi, “Hedonic Pricing Models: A Selective and Applied Review,” Housing Economics, 
11(2), 2002, p.42. 
 
67 Ibid. 
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V = value of the house, as determined by a sales price 
 S = structural characteristics (# of rooms, # of floors, # of bathrooms, etc.) 
 N = neighborhood characteristics  
 L = location within the market (i.e., proximity to a base, schools, hospital, etc.) 
 T = the date of the observation 
 Most literature in this area refers to a hedonic model along these lines as a “ ingle 
equation” model or the “first stage” of a “two-stage” model. Two-stage models attempt to 
go beyond the initial estimation of a hedonic price surface, and in the second stage 
recover structural supply and demand parameters for individual housing characteristics. 
Collapsing the vectors S, N, L into a larger vector X for the moment purely for notational 
convenience, and adopting a common logarithmic functional form, we can re-write the 
regression equation as:68 
              lnV = Xβ + ε           (2) 
so that, finally, we have 
       lnV = Xb + e                  (3) 
 As one would imagine, there are hundreds of potential housing characteristics that 
could be included as independent variables on the right hand side of the regression 
equation.  Butler (1982) and Ozanne and Malpezzi (1985) show that all coefficient 
estimates are not robust with respect to omitted variables.  Interestingly enough, however, 
the same correlation between omitted and included variables that biases individual 
coefficient estimates can and often does help improved prediction from a “sparse” model. 
This, Ozanne and Malpezzi claim, suggests that “hedonic models that rely on overall 
predictions – like place-to-place price indexes, or cost-benefit analysis of housing 
                                                
68 Malpezzi, p.3. 
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subsidies – can proceed apace, even while papers that rely on interpretation of individual 
coefficients must be interpreted more cautiously.” 
 There are almost a limitless number of independent variables that can be included 
in the model. The high correlation of some of these variables with each other can create 
estimation problems even if all the variables are not included in the model. For exampl , 
a location variable may appear to be highly significant in the model but may actually be 
reflecting something else, such as school quality. Because of this, interpretation of the 
individual coefficients can be more difficult.  
 Various studies have also wrestled with the problem of correct functional form. 
Follain and Malpezzi (1980) found that the semi-log specification has some advantages 
over the linear form. Some of these are: (1) it allows for variation in the dollar value of 
each characteristic; (2) the coefficients can be easily interpreted as the percentage change 
in the price given a one-unit change in the characteristic; and (3) the semi-log odel 
helps minimize the problem of heteroscedasticity.  
 Bailey, Muth, and Nourse (1963) is the first true study of housing prices using a 
regression of expenditures (rents or values) on housing characteristics. The indep ndent 
variables represent the individual characteristics of the dwelling, and the regression 
coefficients may be transferred into estimates of the implicit prices of these 
characteristics.  Lancaster (1966) developed a sophisticated branch of microeconomic 
theory in which utility is generated, not by goods per se, but by characteristi s of he 
goods. The applicability to housing is direct and obvious. Many hedonic studies cite 
Lancaster’s work, and justifiably so, for providing microeconomic foundations for 
analyzing utility-generating characteristics.  Rosen (1974) focuses on characteristics, but 
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has less to say about their utility-bearing nature and more about how suppliers and 
consumers interact within a framework of bids and offers for characteristics. Rosen’s 
model naturally leads to a nonlinear hedonic price structure. Many two-stage 
characteristic demand models, in particular, cite Rosen as their theoretical foundation.   
 MacLennan (1977) examines the implicit assumptions made in hedonic studies of 
urban house prices. Previous uses of the technique are examined and it is suggested that 
the methodology is inappropriate for testing hypotheses derived from spatial residential 
models.  Amemiya (1980) provides a sound model on the selection of regressors for 
hedonic pricing models by comparing several simple criteria on the basis of which we 
can select one regression equation among many candidates. He does not recommend any 
single criterion as a definitely superior criterion or as a panacea of theproblem of 
selection. Rather, he tells us that all of the criteria considered are based on a somewhat 
arbitrary assumption which cannot be fully justified, and that by slightly varying the loss 
function and the decision strategy one can indefinitely go on inventing new criteria. Thus, 
the selection of regressors should be primarily based on one's knowledge of the 
underlying economic theory and one's intuition which cannot be easily quantified.   
 Malpezzi (2002) provides a great review of both the history of hedonic pricing 
literature as well as the development of a basic model.  Using historical models as 
examples, he demonstrates how to outline a simple model, how to choose the regressors, 
and how to select the best goodness-of-fit test for the selected model.  As he points out, 
the hedonic model is a way to estimate the value of individual characteristics of the 
house. Hedonic equations have also been used to measure the effect of various factors of
special interest on house prices.  Hedonic models are typically estimated as single-stage 
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equations. That is, the model simply estimates the effect of characteristi s on price and 
does not examine the structural parameters of the individual characteristics. Hedonic 
models also are estimated various ways regarding the dependent variable, the house price. 
Price may be specified as an absolute amount (unlogged) or as a logged variable. The 
most typical model structure historically has been the semi-log form, with the price 
specified in natural logs and regressed against unlogged independent variables. This 
allows for variation in characteristic prices across different price ranges within the 
sample.  
 Sirmans, MacPherson, and Zietz (2005) using 125 hedonic pricing articles 
published since 1995 to chart the most frequently used characteristics included in hedonic 
pricing models.  These include lot size, square feet, age, the number of stories, the 
number of bathrooms, the number of rooms, the number of bedrooms, fireplace, central 
air-conditioning, basement, garage, deck, pool, brick exterior, distance to CBD, time-on-
the-market and a time trend. These variables generally have the expected signs, although 
in some instances they are not significant. Due to the large number of variables, 
categories were created and the top five characteristics from each category were 
identified. The categories and characteristics are: (1) structural features: lot size, square 
feet, age, number of bathrooms and number of bedrooms; (2) internal features: full baths, 
half baths, fireplace, air-conditioning, hardwood floors and basement; (3) external 
features: garage spaces, deck, pool, porch, carport and garage; (4) natural environmtal 
features: lake view, lake front, ocean view and good view; (5) neighborhood and 
location: location, crime, distance, golf course and trees; (6) public services: s hool 
district, percentage of school district minority and public sewer; (7) marketing, 
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occupancy and selling factors: assessor's quality, assessed condition, vacant, owner-
occupied, time-on-the-market and time trend; and (8) financing issues: FHA financing, 
VA financing, foreclosure, favorable financing and property taxes. Most of the 
characteristics have a positive effect on selling price. Those characteristi s that have had 
a negative effect on price include age, crime, percentage of school district minorities and 
vacancy. 
 Sirmans and Macpherson (2003) also looked at the estimated coefficients for 
selected characteristics, and compared them across geographical regions in the United 
States.  Some major conclusions include: (1) The effect of square footage on selling price 
does not have a great deal of variation across regions. The greatest effect was in the 
Southwest and the lowest average effect is in the Midwest; (2) The effect of lot size is 
somewhat consistent across regions; (3) Age of the property is consistently negative and 
the effect on price is also consistent across regions; (4) Each additional bathroom affects 
selling price in the 10% to 12% range, though the effect of bedrooms on price tends to be 
greater in the Northeast than it is in the Southwest; (5) The existence of a firepl ce has a 
positive effect on selling price in the 6% to 12% range and is consistent acrossregions, 
except for the West; (6) Central air-conditioning is consistently important in all regions, 
with the greatest price effect in the Southwest; (7) The existence of a basement adds 
significant value to selling price in most studies in the 12% to 16% range; (8) A 
swimming pool is a consistently significant characteristic with the effect on price being 
the greatest in the Southwest and Southeast; (9) The value of a garage is consistent across 
regions in the 6% to 12% range; and    (10) Perceived school quality consistently has a 
significant effect on selling price.  
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3.3 Event Study Literature 
 
As this paper combines hedonic pricing theory with the classic case study 
methodology, it is also worthwhile to look at the primary event study literature existing n 
the field today.  The first published examination of an event study in finance is Dolley 
(1933).  His study looked at the financial impact of stock splits on the value of the share 
of stock.  Foremost among existing event study literature, however, are four articles: Ball 
and Brown (1968); Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll (FFJR, 1969); MacKinlay (1997); and 
Binder (1998).  Ball and Brown (1968) studied the information content on earnings in an 
event study model, while FFJR (1969) studied the effects of stock splits on the value of 
stock, after first removing the effects of simultaneous dividends increases.  Binder, who 
provides the definitive (though now, slightly outdated) treatise on existing event study 
literature at the time, tells us that event studies have been used for two primary reasons 
by research financiers over time: (1) to test for market efficiency; and (2) to examine the 
effect of some particular event on the wealth of a firm’s shareholders.69  Event study 
methodology has thus become the accepted standard method for measuring the effect of 
some security price to a specific event in time or announcement on a given day.  Though
JJFR (1969) provides us with the first true discussion of an economic or financial event 
study in the market, MacKinlay (1997) actually provides us with the best practical 
discussion of how to execute an event study.  In the introduction to his paper, MacKinlay 
gives us perhaps the best existing-- and most clear and concise-- definition of an event 
study: 
  
                                                
69 John J. Binder, “The Event Study Methodology Since 1969,” Review of Quantitative Finance and 
Accounting, 11 (1998), p. 111. 
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Using financial market data, an event study measures the impact of a specific 
event on the value of a firm.  The usefulness of such a study comes from the fact 
that, given rationality in the marketplace, the effects of an event will be reflect d 
immediately in security prices.  Thus a measure of the event’s economic impact
can be constructed using security prices over a relatively short period of tme.70
 
MacKinlay provides us with a very detailed methodology for executing an event study,
from defining the event window to measuring abnormal returns to accounting for (and 
discarding) any outliers or abnormalities in the data itself. 
Shimpalee and Breuer (2006) provide us with a very good recent article using 
event study methodology.  They utilize the event study framework to study the behavior 
of seven institutional variables in an event window consisting of eighteen months before 
and eighteen months after a currency crisis. They use their results to demonstrate rather 
conclusively that there are many instances where institutions are weaker in periods before 
and after a currency crisis.  
Kothari and Warner (2006) have published a masterful review of both the event 
study methodology as well as the existing literature over the past four decades.  They 
trace the literature from 1974 to 2000, focusing on event study articles found in the five 
leading Finance journals: Journal of Finance, Journal of Business, Journal of Financial 
Economics, the Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, and the Review of 
Financial Studies.  They find 565 articles on event studies published in these five journals 
during this twenty-seven year period.  Their study of these articles demonstrates that the 
basic statistical format for event studies has not changed during that period, and is, in 
fact, based on the same methodology first formulated by Fama, Fisher, Jensen in Roll in 
their 1969 paper on the effect of stock splits on stock prices.   
                                                
70A.  Craig MacKinlay, “Event Studies in Economics and Finance,” Journal of Economic Literature, 35 
(1997), p. 13. 
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Kothari and Warner tell us that despite the continuity in the event study literature 
over time, two main changes in methodology have taken place since 1974.  First, the use 
of daily rather than monthly security return data has become prevalent, which allows for 
more precise measurement of abnormal returns and more informative studies of 
announcement effects. Second, the methods used to estimate abnormal returns and to thus 
calibrate their statistical significance have become more detailed and sophisticated, 
owing to enhanced computer modeling. They believe that this second change is of 
particular importance for long-horizon event studies, which they describe as event studies
in which the event window is greater than one year in length. They tell us that the 
changes in long-horizon event study methods reflect new findings in the late 1990s on the 
statistical properties of long-horizon security returns. This change also p rallels 
developments in the asset pricing literature, particularly the Fama-French 3-factor model. 
Finally, Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay, in their 1997 edition of The Econometrics 
of Financial Markets, devote an entire chapter to the methodology and framework of 
executing a proper event study in the market.  They begin with a short history of he 
literature, then provide an excellent, concise outline for a proper event study.  Their seven 
step outline is: 
(1) Event definition: define both the event of interest along with the event 
window; 
(2) Selection criteria: determine the selection criteria for the inclusion of a given 
firm in the study; 
(3) Normal and abnormal returns: the actual return minus the normal return over 
the event window; 
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(4) Estimation procedure: estimate the parameters of the model using a subset of 
the data known as the estimation window. 
(5) Testing procedure: must define the null hypothesis and determine the 
techniques for aggregating the abnormal returns of the selected firms. 
(6) Empirical results: present basic empirical results along with relevant 
diagnostics. 
(7) Interpretation and conclusions: the empirical results should lead to insights 
about the mechanism by which the event affects security prices.71  
Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay then provide an example of a relevant event study, provide 
excellent insights into measuring normal and abnormal returns, and give instances when 
the null hypothesis can and should be modified.  Though, again, as discussed in relation 
to the Dehring, Depken and Ward paper, my paper does not include the stock specific and 
abnormal returns elements of an event study, it does follow the basic tenets outlined by 
Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay, among others, in the event study literature.  
                                                
71 John Y. Campbell, Anderw W. Lo, and A. Craig MacKinlay, The Econometrics of Financial Markets, 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997, pp. 149- 52. 
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CHAPTER 4: DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
 
This study examines the direct financial effects of both the BRAC announcement 
and the base closing process on the real estate markets in local communities across the 
United States.  In particular, I focus on the base closure announcement involving two 
bases: Reese Air Force Base (AFB), outside of Lubbock, Texas, and Red River Army 
Depot, outside of Texarkana, Texas.  Reese AFB was announced by the DoD for closure 
in the initial BRAC announcement in February 1995, was approved for closure by the 
BRAC Commission in May 1995, signed into law by the President in December 1995, 
and subsequently closed on 30 September 1997.  Red River Army Depot, which was 
recommended by the DoD for closure in February 1995, then recommended by the 
BRAC Commission to remain operational in their final recommendation to the President, 
was again recommend for closure by the DoD in February 2005, again recommended by 
the 2005 BRAC Commission to stay open, and remains active today.  
My decision to choose these two bases, out of the hundreds of bases that have 
been highlighted for closure through the BRAC process over the course of the past 
twenty years, stems from three fundamental criterion.  These criteria ar : (1) Both bases 
are found in areas of largely rural America, remote from any major metropoli an area and 
removed from any high-value real estate regions that may bias the data, an are, I believe, 
in communities very characteristic of main-stream America; (2) Both bases are 
categorized by the Department of Defense as being medium to large bases, th t is, with a 
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combined military and civilian workforce of greater than 2,500 personnel; and, most 
fundamental to this study,  (3) the residential real estate data for both bases had to be 
available for study and analysis.  My initial inclination was to choose four bases from the 
1995 BRAC list, as I could conceivably trace the effects of the BRAC process from 
initial announcement through ultimate closure of the base.  However, it became very 
apparent early on in the research process that the data required for the study, daily real 
estate transactions or, at the very least, monthly average housing prices, was not readily 
available in a format conducive to executing a viable empirical study.  Thus, I ad to 
eliminate two other bases from my initial sample population, Fort Chaffee (Fort Smith, 
Arkansas), and Fort McClellan (Anniston, Alabama), as the real estate data was simply 
not available.  Fortunately, because the of the two different paths that Reese Air Force 
Base and Red River Army Depot followed along their BRAC experience, their 
examination and analysis should shed considerable light on the true effect of BRAC 
announcements on real estate prices in local communities.   
4.1 Reese Air Force Base 
Reese Air Force Base (now Reese Technology Center) is situated on 
approximately 2,987 acres of land, fourteen miles west of Lubbock, Texas (see Figure 2). 
The base was established on 26 June 1941, and served as a major training center 
throughout the Second World War, producing as many as 7,000 bomber pilots throughout 
the war.  Closed for a short period between December 1945 and November 1949, the 
base became a major initial aviation training center for the United States Air Force.  In 
1972, Reese became home to the 64th Flying Training Wing, in which student pilots 
received about 748 academic hours of instruction and 176 hours of flying during a   
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Figure 2: Reese Air Force Base and Lubbock County, Texas 
(Source: Google Maps) 
Reese 
AFB
Reese 
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61 
 
Table 9: Base Demographics 
County Base Workforce
Installation State County Population Acreage Military     Civilian
Reese Air Force Base TX Lubbock 186,206¹ 2,987 2,900       1,238
  Red River Army Depot TX Bowie 36,054² 18,000 2,000       1,300
AR Miller 30,006²
¹ 1995 Census Bureau Estimate
² 2005 Census Bureau Estimate
 
 
year-long instruction program; the Wing prepared nearly 400 fully-trained new pilots 
every year. 
During its peak years, Reese Air Force Base employed more than 1,200 civilian 
employees, along with its permanent military population of 2,500 and an  
annually rotating student (pilot training) population of 400 (see Table 9).  The base also  
provided the local community of Lubbock, Texas with an estimated $6.4 million annually 
in to the local economy.72  When Reese was closed, many feared that the economic 
impact would be felt for years to come. One major problem encountered by the Reese 
redevelopment authority was the pre-existence of a regional airport in Lubbock, which is 
only fourteen miles from the base.  According to the Handbook of Texas Online, this 
airport was serving four major airlines (American, America West, Delta, and Southwest) 
by the late 1980s, with over 500,000 passengers annually passing through its terminals.73 
While most successful redevelopment efforts concentrate on utilizing the assets left by 
the departing service, the Lubbock airport hampered Reese’s efforts to follow this model. 
A redevelopment plan that focused on the airfield would have created direct competition 
                                                
72 Michael Castellon,  “Flying High Again,” Austin, Texas: Office of the Texas Comptroller of Public 
Accounts, August 2008, p.1. 
73 This information is available through the Handbook f Texas Online, an official resource of the states of 
Texas, and can be accessed at: http://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/LL/hdl4.html. 
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with the facility in Lubbock. Further hindering the efforts at Reese, neither the city of 
Lubbock nor the State of Texas provided financial assistance to the redevelopment 
authority.   
As reported by the Lubbock County Chamber of Commerce, the job replacement 
rate at Reese had been slower than many former air bases. But by October 2005, more 
than 1,500 jobs had been restored, and per capita personal income in Lubbock County 
had risen from $24,785 in 1995 to $34,459 in 2005.74 
One problem that initially hampered the speed of economic development and 
recovery, however, was that initially the best maintained facilities on the base were 
transferred directly to Texas Tech (the largest employer in Lubbock County) and South 
Plains College. While the education and research activities provide a magnet to area 
redevelopment, the schools provide no financial assistance through either rent or taxes to 
the redevelopment authority, while the authority is responsible for maintaining the 
grounds and all the other facilities.75 
4.2 Red River Army Depot 
Red River Army Depot is located on more than 18,000 acres of land 15 miles west of the 
border cities of Texarkana, Texas and Texarkana, Arkansas (see Figure 3). Th Depot 
was established on 9 August 1941 as an ammunition storage depot, less than four months 
before the United States was provoked into action as a result of the Japanese attack at
Pearl Harbor. The demands of the Second World War caused major expansion at the  
  
                                                
74 Lubbock, Texas Chamber of Commerce, available online at http://www.lubbock.org. 
75 “New Beginnings: How Base Closures Can Improve Local Economies and Transfer America’s Military,” 
Center for National Security Reform, Washington, D.C.: 2008. 
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Figure 3: Red River Army Depot, Bowie County, TX and Miller County, AR  
(Source: Google Maps) 
Red River
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Depot, resulting in its use as a general supply storage and tank repair facility.  Today, 
Red River Army Depot employs nearly 4,300 civilian and Army contracting employees  
(see Table 9) in support of its mission to produce and refurbish rubber products (truck 
tires, and road wheels and track pads for the treads on tanks and other mechanized 
vehicles) and repair large vehicles (to include in the Army’s High Mobility Multi-purpose 
Wheeled Vehicle, or HMMWV; the Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck, or 
HEMTT, and the Small Emplacement Excavator, or SEE).  Red River Army Depot’s 
command team touts the Depot as “the largest employer in the four states are.”76   
 The twin cities of Texarkana, Texas and Texarkana Arkansas, though two 
separate political entities with separate city governments, school systems, public utilities 
programs, nonetheless operate as one commercial business entity.  With a combined 
population of nearly 70,000, the Texarkana, U.S.A. Chamber of Commerce touts that 
Texarkana's industrial base is broadly diversified. The Red River Army Depot 
provides the Army’s only facility for rubber products associated with track 
vehicles. This defense complex is capable of rebuilding/recapitalizing over 30 
HMMV’s each day. The region’s timber industry supports two paper mills. 
Cooper Tire and Rubber and Alcoa join the list of productive, skilled 
manufacturers. Approximately 80 percent of new jobs have come from 
expansions of existing industry; the remaining 20 percent have come from new 
plants. The diversity of products from manufacturing in the metropolitan 
Texarkana area verifies the availability of a trainable work force.77 
   
On 13 May 2005, the Department of Defense published its report on BRAC 2005.  
Appendix K of the report, the Department of Defense Proposed 2005 Realignment and 
Closure List, recommended that Red River Army depot be closed and all of its 
                                                
76 This information is extracted from the Red River Army Depot command home page, an official entity of 
the United States Army and the Department of Defense.  
77 Texarkana Chamber of Commerce, available online at: http://www.texarkana.org. 
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operational and logistical functions be transferred to other bases across the United States.  
In the report, the DoD cited the loss of 4,175 jobs at Red River Army Depot.78 
In between the receipt of the DoD BRAC report and its requirement to present 
their own finding and recommendations to the President, the BRAC Commission paid 
three separate visits to Red River Army depot: 21 June 2005 (James T. Hill and Sue E. 
Turner); 10 July 2005 (Anthony J. Principi, BRAC Commission Chairman); and 27 July 
2005 (James H. Bilbray).79 This was a good sign for Red River Army Depot, for by the 
statutory guidelines of the BRAC process (see page 10 of this study), the Commission 
could only overturn a recommendation for closure by the Secretary of Defense if at least 
two Commissioners physically visited the base, and if seven of the nine Commissioner  
subsequently voted to overturn the DoD recommendation. 
On 8 September 2005, the BRAC Commission issued its Final Report to the 
President.  In the report, the Commission voted to overturn the DoD recommendation for 
closing Red River Army Depot, and recommending instead that some of its capabilities 
be realigned and moved to McAlester Army Ammunition Plant, Oklahoma; Blue Grass 
Army Depot, Kentucky; and Letterkenny Army Depot, Pennsylvania.  Specifically, the 
Commission recommends:  
By Motion 7-4A, the Commission struck the language “Close Red River Army 
Depot, TX. Relocate the depot maintenance of Armament and Structural 
Components, Combat Vehicles, Depot Fleet/Field Support, Engines and 
Transmissions, Fabrication and Manufacturing, Fire Control Systems and 
Components, and Other to Anniston Army Depot, AL. Relocate the depot 
maintenance of Powertrain Components, and Starters/Generators to Marine Corps 
Logistics Base Albany, GA. Relocate the depot maintenance of Construction 
Equipment to Anniston Army Depot, AL, and Marine Corps Logistics Base 
Albany, GA. Relocate the depot maintenance of Tactical Vehicles to Tobyhanna 
                                                
78 Department of Defense BRAC Report, Appendix K, 13 May 2005, p K-2. 
79 2005 Defense Base Realignment and Closure Commission report, Appendix J: Commissioner and Staff 
Installation Site Visits, 8 September 2005, pp. J-7 – J-10. 
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Army Depot, PA and Letterkenny Depot, PA.” and replaced it with the language 
“Realign Red River Army Depot, TX.”, and struck the language “Relocate the 
storage and distribution functions and associated inventories of the Defense 
Distribution Depot to the Defense Distribution Depot, Oklahoma City, OK.”80 
 
4.3 Data 
 
As transactional real estate data at the county level has only been maintained in a 
form consistent with a study such as this since the early 2000s, I am able to reais ically 
capture only the effects of the BRAC closure announcements on residential property 
values in and around Red River Army Depot, that is, the counties of Bowie County, 
Texas and Miller County, Arkansas.  I am also able to utilize the monthly mean real 
estate values in and around Reese Air Force Base (Lubbock County, Texas) to test some 
of the effects of the base closure announcements using less robust means. 
Thus, the data I have utilized for this study is two-fold.  First, I use the monthly 
mean real estate prices for a single-family home in each of the counties surrounding the 
two military bases designated for closure (Red River Army Depot and Reese Air Force 
Base), data I obtained through and with the permission of the Texas A&M University 
Real Estate Center.  I also utilize actual transactional residential real estate data, obtained 
from the Tax Assessors office in Bowie County, Texas and Miller County, Arkansas, to 
examine the effects of the BRAC announcements on the value of residential real estate in 
the communities surrounding Red River Army Depot.  Mean residential property values, 
as well as actual MLS transactions prices are examined at the following points in the 
BRAC cycle: 1 year prior to the official DoD base closure announcement; the da e of the 
DoD announcement itself; the date of the BRAC Commission announcement; the date of 
                                                
80 2005 Defense Base Realignment and Closure Commission report, Appendix Q: Commission’s Final 
Recommendations, 8 September 2005, pp. Q-4 – Q-5. 
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the President’s announcement officially approving the BRAC Commission list; 1 year 
after the President’s announcement; and, in the case of Reese Air Force Base, 1 year 
following the closure of the base itself.  These dates are aligned with the BRAC time 
cycle mandated by the U.S. Congress in 1988 (and subsequent laws governing the BRAC 
process):   
 
Table 10: BRAC Closure Announcements, 1988 – 2005  
    
   DoD   Commission  Final List Process Process 
Announcement    Recommendation     Approved  Started      Completed 
28 Feb 1988      3 May 1988  29 Dec 1988   Jan 1990   Oct 1995 
28 Feb 1991    13 May 1991         12 Dec 1991  July 1993   July 1997 
28 Feb 1993    12 May 1993         13 Dec 1993  July 1995    July 1999 
28 Feb 1995    13 May 1995            28 Dec 1995  July 1997    July 2001 
13 May 2005      8 Sep 2005         18 Dec 2005  July 2007    July 2011 (T)   
 
 
Thus, in addition to observing the effect of the base closure itself on the price of houses 
throughout the entire BRAC timeline, I am also able to observe whether the release of the 
list (analogous to an announcement in the securities market) has any effect on the price of 
real estate in the local community. 
The test of the impact of base closure announcements on residential property 
values combines hedonic pricing models, event study methodology, and difference-in-
difference estimators. Hedonic pricing reveals the implicit price of housing and location 
attributes, as well as any price effects from the base closure announcement.  Because 
each announcement increases or decreases the probability that a base on the list will close 
over the course of the subsequent four year period, each is allowed to have an impact on 
68 
 
property values (McKinlay, 1997).  I utilize a difference-in-difference identification 
strategy to distinguish the net amenity effect before and after each announcement, similar 
to the method employed by Dehring, Depken, and Ward (2007).  As I have detailed 
previously, there is a large body of literature that exists on hedonic pricing models of 
residential real estate. These studies demonstrate that in most regions of the country a 
great deal of the variation in house prices can be explained by a house's age, its size and 
the size of the lot it sits on, and the quality of local hospitals and public schools.  
Following standard practice, I include these controls in order to study the effect of the 
BRAC announcement on local real estate prices, although I am not able to include any 
measure of the quality of local schools and hospitals in my study. 
The announcements shown in Table 10 correspond with the dates on which the 
Secretary of Defense first delivered the list of base closures and realignment to the 
Congress.  One obvious difference from standard event studies is that we cannot track 
daily changes in the value of a single house but must draw inferences from prices of 
different houses. Another is that we are not calculating the return relative to h  general 
market as one would do when analyzing abnormal stock returns. Any price effect from a 
proposed base closure should be reflected in the prices of houses benefiting (or suffering) 
from the expected net effect at the time of the announcement.   
I utilize a general difference-in-difference identification strategy to calculate the 
effects of BRAC announcement.  For example, for the first announcement, I include a 
dummy variable, an announcement date dummy variable, and an interacted variable of 
the distance of the property to the main gate of Red River Army Depot interacted with the 
post-announcement period.  I use the distance from each individual property to the main 
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gate as there is one major entrance/exit to Red River Army depot that the vast majority of 
employees use to enter and exit the base each day. Since the measured effect of the 
interaction represents the differential impact of the BRAC announcement on houses in 
the local community relative to either general announcement effects independent of 
location at different times, I identify it with the expected effect of increased taxation on 
home prices in the local community. 
The estimating equation is thus represented as:                                                                                 
 
ln(PRICEi) = βFEATURESi + δANNOUNCEi + γANNOUNCEi • DISTTOi + εi          (4) 
 
where  β, δ, and γ are vectors of parameters to be estimated, and εi is a composite zero- 
 
mean error term that facilitates neighborhood fixed effects and spatial correlati n. 
As shown in Table 11, the dependent variable ln(PRICE) is the natural logarithm 
of the sale price of the house. The vector FEATURES includes both structural and 
location attributes including structure age, age squared, square feet of living area, area 
squared, and dummy variables identifying the class of the house (either one story or two-
story). The vector ANNOUNCE includes the appropriate dummy variables, for the 
sample analyzed, indicating whether the sale of the house was executed after ach of the 
three announcements. In the case of Reese Air Force Base, I have also included a fourth 
dummy variable corresponding to the date in which the base actually closed down (30 
September 1997).  The variable DISTTO is a variable indicating the distance that the 
home is from a variety of key locations within the community (the main gate of Red 
River Army Depot, major hospitals, schools, transportation nodes, etc.)  Each successive 
announcement signals an increased likelihood that a base on the BRAC list will shut  
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Table 11: Variable Descriptions  
 
Variable Description
LNPRICE Natural log of the sale price
AGE Age of the house (in year)
AGE2 Age of the house squared
SQFT Size of the house (in square feet)
SQFT2 Size of the house squared
DISTO Distance from the house to one of 26 key locations (see Tabl  11)
ANNOUNCE1 Date of the Initial BRAC Announcement by the Secretary of Defense
ANNOUNCE2 Date of the BRAC Announcement by the BRAC Commission
ANNOUNCE3 Date of the Final BRAC Announcement by the Secretary of Defense
CLOSE Actual Date of the Base Closing (for Reese AFB monthly data only).
INTER1 ANNOUNCE1 * DISTTO 1
INTER2 ANNOUNCE2 * DISTTO 1
INTER3 ANNOUNCE3 * DISTTO 1
 
down. Thus, if the base closure had a net negative (positive) expected impact on the 
community's attributes, I anticipate each announcement to correspond with a decre se 
(increase) on house prices in the locally affected community, relative to the surrounding 
areas. 
I have also included two instrumental variables which serve to capture the overall
effect of the changes in residential real estate at both the national level as w l as the local 
level, in order to preclude any autocorrelation between the transactional real estate prices 
and real estate price in general.  At the national level, I have used a composite index of 
seasonally-adjusted home price values from the Case-Shiller Home Price Indices, which 
captures the value at real estate across the entire nation.  At the local level, I have used 
the average value of homes in the Texarkana, Texas area, as captured in data from the 
Texas A&M University Real Estate Center.    
Using Stata, I also utilize a Generalized Least Squares (GLS) estimator that takes 
into account possible heteroscedasticity and spatial autocorrelation. Since I cannot reject 
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that the error term has a common component at the city level, my estimator allows the 
variances to differ across geographic areas.  First, I determined the exact latitudinal and 
longitudinal coordinates for these key areas in the community: (1) the main gate of Red 
River Army Depot; (2) the one college and four major high schools; (3) the five major 
middle schools; (4) the fourteen major elementary schools; (5) the four major hospitals; 
(6) the Texarkana Regional Airport; (7) the Amtrak Station; (8) the Greyhound Bus 
Terminal; and the access roads to all major highways in the Texarkana regional area (see 
Table 12). The inclusion and use of these key areas is consistent with existing historical 
hedonic pricing literature, particularly the inclusion of the major schools and hospitals.  
As the nearest major airport, Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport, is approximately 
175 miles from Texarkana, the existence and location of the regional airport, Amtrak 
station, and Greyhound bus terminal take on a much greater importance than one would 
assume for a larger city.  Also, I have included the main gate of Red River Army Depot 
because it is truly the only way on an off the installation; anyone desiring to enter the 
base must use this gate.   
 Then, utilizing a convention consistent with the methodology of Read (2008), 
GIS software was used to identify the location of each property in the dataset based on its 
sale address.81  Each individual property was then geo-coded with its exact latitudinal and  
Longitudinal coordinates, and the distance from each of the properties to the key  
 
locations in Table 12 was determined.82   
 
  
                                                
81 See Read (2008), p. 105.  I made the decision to utilize this methodology in my own study based on 
several conversations that I had with Dr. Read in early 2009. 
82 Thomas Luddens, a GIS specialist in The Center for Applied Geographic Information Science (CAGIS) 
at UNC Charlotte, executed the actual geo-coding of this data for me.   
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Table 12: GIS Spatialization Data 
 
Variable Name Key Locations
DISTTO1 Main Gate, Red River Army Depot
DISTTO2 Texarkana Regional Airport
DISTTO3 Texarkana Greyhound Bus Terminal
DISTTO4 Texarkana Amtrak Station
DISTTO5 Living Hope Hospital
DISTTO6 Christus St. Michael Hospital
DISTTO7 Healthsouth Rehabilitation Hospital
DISTTO8 Wadley Regional Medical Center
DISTTO9 Arkansas High School
DISTTO10 Texarkana College
DISTTO11 Texas High School
DISTTO12 Liberty-Eylau High School
DISTTO13 Pleasant Grove High School
DISTTO14 I-30/ HWY 98 (Exit 198)
DISTTO15 I-30/ HWY 82 (Exit 199)
DISTTO16 I-30/ HWY 8 (Exit 201)
DISTTO17 I-30/ RRAD #1 (Exit 206)
DISTTO18 I-30/ RRAD #2 (Exit 208)
DISTTO19 I-30/ RRAD #3 (Exit 212)
DISTTO20 I-30/ HWY 151 Loop (Exit 220A)
DISTTO21 I-30/ HWY 93 (Exit 222)
DISTTO22 I-30/ HWY 71 (Exit 223)
DISTTO23 I-30/ HWY 245 Loop (Exit 2)
DISTTO24 I-30/ HWY 108 (Exit 7)
DISTTO25 HWY 82/ 245 Loop
DISTTO26 HWY 549/ 245 Loop  
 
Approximately 90% of the homes in the original Miller County dataset were 
successfully located using this method, while only 75% of those homes in the original 
Bowie County dataset were located.  I did not take into account the quality of either 
schools or hospitals in this study.  Though I know from previous research that some 
hospitals and schools have a better reputation than others and it is thus more desirable for  
homeowners to buy a home nearer these locations, I have treated each major hospital and 
high school equally. 
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Figure 4: Fixed Effects Grid Zone Designators 
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Using Stata, I use a robust GLS estimator that allows for fixed-effects and 
clustering based on all of the aforementioned community and transportation nodes. 
Again, using GIS, I have overlaid both counties with a grid system whereby each 
property in the database falls into one of 299 grid squares (99 in Bowie County, Texas, 
and 199 in Miller County, Arkansas; see Figure 4.  Thus, using this fixed-effect estimator 
I am harnessing the collective effects of over fifty separate variables in the community.  
My data include two samples of residential property sales in the Texarkana 
metropolitan area, from one year prior to the BRAC announcement through one year 
from the date that the base was either shut down or removed from the list.  The residential 
property sales data were collected from the Multiple Listing Service. I subtract thirty days 
from the closing date, reported by the MLS, to more closely align house contract daes 
with the announcement effects, as thirty days is the approximate time it takes most 
residential home sales to go to closing once an initial contract has been signd.  To avoid 
the undue influence of outliers in the dataset, I have excluded observations that 
corresponded to houses older than fifty years old, more than 6,000 square feet or less than 
500 square feet, and valued at more than $1,000,000 or less than $10,000.00.  I also 
included only those properties that were within twenty miles of Red River Army Depot, 
in either Bowie County, Texas or Miller County, Arkansas.  I use this number because 
according to the latest survey conducted by the Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS) 
in the United States, sixty-eight percent of Americans have an average one-way commute 
to work of approximately fifteen miles, while another twenty-two percent of Americans 
are willing to drive between sixteen and thirty miles to work each day.83 
                                                
83 Department of Transportation, Bureau of Transportati n Statistics, OmniStats Report, October 2003, 
Volume 3, Issue 4.   
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CHAPTER 5: EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
 
I utilized Stata regression software to execute an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
regression in order to estimate the preliminary hedonic price equations, in accord nce 
with the conventions of previous hedonic pricing literature. Specifically, I estimate the 
difference-in-difference model described in equation (4), including the community fixed 
effects found in Table 12.  I account for any spatial correlation among the home prices by 
clustering the error terms in the fixed-effect boxes shown in Figure 4.   
Descriptive statistics of the variables in the model are found in Table 13.  The 
home characteristics utilized in my hedonic pricing model are generally consistent across 
the two counties, Bowie County, Texas and Miller County, Arkansas.  For example, the 
average age of homes in the data sample is just over 16 years for Bowie County, and 
approximately 17.5 years for Miller County.  The average size of the homes acrosthe 
sample is 1822 square feet for Bowie County, and 1792 square feet for Miller County.  
The average acreage across both counties is also fairly similar, with an aver ge lot size of 
1.15 acres in Bowie County, and 1.09 acres in Miller County.  The monthly breakdown in 
the data is also consistent with historical residential property sales statistics, and shows 
that there is a spike in sales during the summer months of June, July and August, while 
there is a sharp downturn in sales in the fall months of October and November. 
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Table 13: Descriptive Statistics84 
 
LN Sale Price 11.2998 0.7394 10.9805 1.1834
Age (Years) 16.2705 12.4579 17.6313 11.9735
Size (Square Feet) 1822.42 663.68 1791.89 777.30
Acres 1.1472 0.3985 1.0891 0.4864
February 0.0787 0.2819 0.0768 0.2819
March 0.0823 0.2776 0.0837 0.2717
April 0.0792 0.2882 0.0814 0.2879
May 0.0877 0.2765 0.0909 0.2664
June 0.0947 0.2911 0.0939 0.2898
July 0.0986 0.2844 0.0947 0.2777
August 0.0950 0.2901 0.0961 0.2888
September 0.0788 0.2561 0.0767 0.2652
October 0.0598 0.2525 0.0644 0.2508
November 0.0618 0.2447 0.0589 0.2486
December 0.0684 0.2559 0.0613 0.2613
Distance to Main Gate 12.0663 3.3043 18.9077 4.2199
Distance to Texarkana Airport 8.5667 6.6714 4.2920 4.5826
Distance to Greyhound Terminal 6.5670 6.5479 4.7000 5.2511
Distance to Amtrak Station 6.4379 6.4310 4.5604 4.3910
Distance to Wadley RMC 6.0185 6.4755 4.5585 4.5794
Distance to St. Michael Hospital 5.1622 6.2326 5.9384 5.0584
Distance to Living Hope Hospital 6.5654 6.6176 4.2220 5.1387
Distance to Texarkana College 4.8828 6.1302 5.9300 4.7656
Distance to Texas High School 5.2447 6.4022 -------- --------
Distance to Arkansas High School -------- -------- 3.9388 4.6937
Announcement 1 0.6452 0.4785 0.6217 0.4386
Announcement 2 0.5615 0.4963 0.5327 0.4763
Announcement 3 0.3597 0.4800 0.3421 0.4727
Interaction 1 12.0014 9.5778 12.6437 8.9917
Interaction 2 10.4008 9.7700 11.6349 9.1774
Interaction 3 6.5938 9.1697 8.7329 9.3428
Number of Observations 573 2013
 
 
 
                                                
84 Data reflects residential property sales transactions from 1 January 2004 through 31 December 2006 of 
all residential property located within thirty miles of Red River Army Depot, in both Bowie County, Texas 
and Miller County, Arkansas.  January is the reference month (and is thus not reflected in the descriptive 
statistics).  Data was obtained from the office of the Tax Assessor for both Bowie and Miller Counties. 
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The data also shows that the average distance from property in Miller County to 
the main gate of Red River Army Depot (DISTTO1) is over 50% greater (18.91 miles)
than the same distance from property in Bowie County (12.07 miles).  Conversely,  
property in Miller County tends to be much closer to the primary transportation centers, 
the Texarkana Regional Airport, Greyhound Terminal, and Amtrak Station, than property 
across the state line in Bowie County. 
The combined table of complete regression results can be found in Appendix A. 
The primary hedonic regression results of concern are found in Table 14 and Table 15.  
Table 14 details the results for Bowie County and Miller County separately, while Tab  
15 displays the results of the combined data regression.  In both cases, the results are 
consistent with the results and conventions of previous studies on hedonic pricing 
models.  For example, the results in Tables 14 and 15 demonstrate that, as we would 
expect, for each additional year of age for a home in the sample, the value of the home 
decreases by approximately 3% (2.54% for the Bowie County sample and 3.12% for the 
Miller County sample).  Conversely, and again as we would expect to find, every 
additional 58 square feet would lead to a 1% increase in the value of the home (58.96 feet 
for Bowie County and 57.77 feet for Miller County).  The same is true with regard to 
additional acres of land, that is, every acre of additional land increase the value of the 
property by approximately 4.5%.  These are all significant at the .001 level. 
Of additional note in the hedonic regression results are those of the distance 
variables.  As Tables 14 and 15 demonstrate, an additional one-mile in the distance of the 
property from the front gate of Red River Army Depot leads to an approximately 6% 
decrease in property value (7.07% for Bowie County; 6.18% for Miller County).  This is  
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Table 14: Hedonic Pricing Regression Results by County 
 
Bowie County Miller County 
Variable Sample Sample
Age -0.0254*** (0.0115) -0.0312*** (0.0093)
Age Squared 0.0011*** (0.0003) 0.0012*** (0.0004)
Square Feet (x .001) 0.1696*** (0.0384) 0.1731*** (0.0391)
Square Feet Squared (x .00001) -0.0002*** (0.0002) -0.00 2*** (0.0003)
LN Acres  0.0432*    (0.0417)  0.0469*    (0.0428)
Distance to Main Gate -0.0707*** (0.0081) -0.0618*** (0.0074)
Distance to Airport -0.0621*** (0.0038) -0.0511*** (0. 049)
Distance to Bus Station -0.0444      (0.0056) -0.0508      (0.0044)
Distance to Train Station -0.0239        (.0037) -0.0242        (.0021)
Constant 11.6446 12.0218
F-stat 111.45 132.27
R² 0.6384 0.6099
Observations 573 2013
*** Significant at the 0.01 level
**   Significant at the 0.05 level
*     Significant at the 0.1 level  
 
 
Table 15: Combined Hedonic Pricing Regression Results 
 
Combined Texarkana
Variable Sample
Age -0.0296*** (0.0115)
Age Squared 0.0012*** (0.0003)
Square Feet (x .001) 0.1721*** (0.0395)
Square Feet Squared (x.00001) -0.0002*** (0.0004)
LN Acres  0.0448*    (0.0463)
Distance to Main Gate -0.0637*** (0.0090)
Distance to Airport -0.0539*** (0.0087)
Distance to Bus Station -0.0483     (0.0053)
Distance to Train Station -0.0241       (.0025)
Constant 11.8754
F-stat 123.76
R² 0.6147
Observations 2586
*** Significant at the 0.01 level
**   Significant at the 0.05 level
*     Significant at the 0.1 level  
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also true of the distance from the property to the Texarkana Regional Airport (5.39%), 
the Greyhound Bus Terminal (4.83%), and the Amtrak Station (2.41%); the distance to 
the main gate and the airport are also both significant at the 1% level. 
Though, as previously detailed, I did not have access to transactional real estate 
data for the period in which Reese AFB and Lubbock County, Texas underwent the 
BRAC closing process, I nonetheless utilized the availability of monthly average selling 
price data (through the Texas A&M University Real Estate Center) to studythe effects of 
the BRAC process in this region.  These results are shown in Table 16, and clearly 
illustrate that there is a definite negative effect from both the BRAC closure 
announcements for Reese AFB as well as the actual closure of the base itself.   
Though based on monthly data and thus built around only 60 observations, the 
results nevertheless demonstrate that the month after the Department of Defense 
announced that Reese would close down (February 1995; ANNOUNCE1), the value of 
property in Lubbock County declined by just over 3%.  This was also true just after the 
BRAC Commission issued its final report in May 1995 (ANNOUNCE2), though unlike 
ANNOUNCE1, this result is not significant at even the 10% level.  However, when the 
President approved the final BRAC Commission recommendations in December 1995 
(ANNOUNCE3), the value of real estate fell almost 6% in Lubbock County (and this 
result is significant at the 5% level.  Finally, and most importantly as it agrees with the 
earlier studies on the immediate economic impact of the BRAC process on Lubbock 
County, the month after Reese closed its gates for good on 30 September 1997, the value 
of real estate in Lubbock County fell over 7.5% (and this is significant at the 1% level).   
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Table 16: Regression Results for Reese Air Force Base BRAC Closure Announcements 
 
Lubbock County
Variable Monthly Data
ANNOUNCE 1 -0.0303**  (0.0450)
ANNOUNCE 2 -0.0288      (0.0474)
ANNOUNCE 3 -0.0572**  (0.0394)
CLOSE -0.0760*** (0.0245)
F-stat 71.56
Prob > F 0.0000
R² 0.2881
Observations 60
*** Significant at the 0.01 level
**   Significant at the 0.05 level
*     Significant at the 0.1 level  
 
 
Table 17: Regression Results for Red River army Depot BRAC Closure Announcements 
 
Texarkana, Texas
Variable Monthly Data
ANNOUNCE 1 -0.1007**  (0.0648)
ANNOUNCE 2 0.0317      (0.0700)
ANNOUNCE 3 0.0190      (0.0418)
F-stat 61.62
Prob > F 0.0000
R² 0.5008
Observations 36
*** Significant at the 0.01 level
**   Significant at the 0.05 level
*     Significant at the 0.1 level  
 
In the same manner, I utilize monthly average real estate prices in Bowie Cunty, Texas 
during the 2005 BRAC process timeline in order to draw some preliminary results on the 
effect of the BRAC base closure announcements on the value of residential real estate in 
the local community.  Table 17 details these results. 
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Though the explanatory power of a model utilizing only three variables and thirty-
six observations may be less than ideal, at the same time these results provide a goo  
basis with which to understand the expected results of a dataset with a substantially l rger 
sample population.  We see that after the month of the first BRAC announcement 
(ANNOUNCE1), the value of real estate in Texarkana fell by 10%.  This result is 
significant at the 5% level and, indeed, makes perfect intuitive sense, as Red River Army 
Depot was recommended for closure by the Department of Defense in its initial report.  
Though not significant at even the 10% level, the results of the second (ANNOUNCE2) 
and third (ANNOUNCE3) on the value of residential real estate in the Texarkana, Tex s 
area still agree with what we would expect if both those announcements signaled a 
positive result for Red River Army Depot and the surrounding community. 
 Thus, I did have access to good transactional residential real estate data for the 
Texarkana, Texas/Arkansas region in order to look at the effects of the 2005 BRAC 
process at Red River Army Depot on local real estate prices.  The dependent variable is 
the natural log of the sale price of the home.  As demonstrated in the hedonic pricing 
results, all three specifications include the following independent variables: ag  of the 
home, age squared, size of the home (in square feet), size squared, the natural log of the
lot size (in acres), month-specific dummy variables, 26 individual geo-coded distance 
variables (see Table 12), three BRAC announcement dummy variables, three interactive 
difference-in-difference variables, and community wide fixed-effects clustered in the 
series of 299 different grids depicted in Figure 4.   
These results are shown in Tables 18 and 19.  They tell us an interesting story as it 
relates to the value of residential real estate values in and around Red River Army Depot  
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Table 18: Results of BRAC Closure Announcements on Real Estate Prices in Bowie 
County, Texas and Miller County, Arkansas 
 
  Bowie County Miller County  
Variable Sample Sample 
ANNOUNCE1 -0.0446*** (0.0316) -0.0512*** (0.0274) 
ANNOUNCE2 0.0348        (0.0489) 0.0414       (0.0617) 
ANNOUNCE3 0.0549        (0.0340) 0.0522       (0.0388) 
INTER1 0.0242**    (0.0307) 0.0316**    (0.0399) 
INTER2 -0.0125       (0.0302) -0.0211       (0.0104) 
INTER3 -0.0507*** (0.0197) -0.0618*** (0.0318) 
Constant 11.6446*** 12.0218*** 
F-stat 111.45 132.27 
R² 0.6384 0.6099 
Observations 573 2013 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level 
**   Significant at the 0.05 level 
*     Significant at the 0.1 level 
 
 
Table 19: Combined Results of BRAC Closure Announcements on Real Estate Prices in 
Texarkana, Texas/Arkansas 
 
  Combined Texarkana 
Variable Sample 
ANNOUNCE1 -0.0494*** (0.0207) 
ANNOUNCE2 0.0392       (0.0576) 
ANNOUNCE3 0.0528       (0.0444) 
INTER1 0.0277**   (0.0385) 
INTER2 -0.0192        (0.0374) 
INTER3 -0.0547*** (0.0276) 
Constant 11.8754*** 
F-stat 123.76 
R² 0.6147 
Observations 2586 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level 
**   Significant at the 0.05 level 
*     Significant at the 0.1 level 
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as a result of the depot’s navigation of the 2005 BRAC process.  First, in the period 
following the first announcement by the Department of Defense (ANNOUNCE1), the 
value of residential real estate fell by nearly 5% in the Texarkana, Texs/Arkansas 
region.  This seems to be counter-intuitive, except that we again recall that in te 
Department of Defense’s initial BRAC recommendation in 2005, Red River Army Depot  
was scheduled to close down.  This result is also significant at the 1% level.  Aftr the 
BRAC Commission released its own recommendations on 15 September 2005 
(ANNOUNCE2), the value of real estate in the region rose by nearly 4%, though this 
result is not significant even at the 10% level.  This result makes sense, as well,  in its 
final report, the BRAC Commission recommended that Red River Army Depot remain 
open and operational.  Finally, after the President approved the BRAC Commission’s 
recommendations, a solid confirmation that Red River Army Depot would remain open, 
the value of real estate in the Texarkana region rose again by approximately 5%, and this 
result is significant at the 1% level. 
 The results of the difference-in-difference variables also tell a compelling story 
with respect to the Red River Army Depot and the BRAC process.  As Table 19 details, 
the variable INTER1, denoting the interaction between the first announcement by the 
Department of Defense (ANNOUNCE1) and the distance from the property to the main 
gate at Red River Army Depot (DISTTO1), leads to a 2.77% increase in the value of real 
estate in the Texarkana region.  This again makes intuitive sense, as the first
announcement signaled the closing of Red River Army Depot, which leads to a negative 
effect on real estate in the region, as does the increasing of distance betwe n any one 
property and Red River Army Depot, thus resulting in an overall positive increase on real 
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estate in the region (this result is significant at the 5% level).  Conversely, th  variable 
INTER3, denoting the interaction between the final announcement by the President 
(ANNOUNCE3) and the distance from the property to the main gate at Red River Army 
Depot (DISTTO1), leads to a 5.47% decrease in the value of real estate in the Texarkana 
region.  This also makes intuitive sense, as the final announcement signaled the continued 
operation of Red River Army Depot, which leads to a positive effect on real estate in the 
region, while the increasing of distance between any one property and Red River Army 
Depot results in a negative effect on real estate, thus resulting in an overallnegative 
effect on real estate in the region.  This result is significant at the 5% lvel.
 Finally, in order to determine whether the sum of the three announcements had a 
net overall positive or negative effect on the value of real estate in the Texarkana region 
during this period, I tested all three announcements using the linear combination 
command in Stata.  Using conventional significance levels, the results indicate that the 
overall effect of the three announcements, though slightly positive, is a zero net impac  
over the course of this period, and that this result is significant at the 10% level.  This is
very important, as if this result had been less than zero, then we could only assume that 
the negative effect of the initial announcement, that is, that Red River Army Depot was 
going to close down, had a permanent negative effect on property values, one that ev n 
subsequent favorable announcements could not correct.  Thus, from a DoD policy 
perspective, the damage done by this initial “false” announcement has a negative short 
term effect, but no long term impact on the value of residential property in the 
community surrounding the base initially marked for closure.  
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS 
 
 I have shown that the Department of Defense occupies expansive property in the 
way of military installations in the United States and its territories, and that these 
installations are as much the fabric of the American landscape as any large corporate 
operation in the nation.  I have also shown that the Base Realignment and Closure 
(BRAC) Process is a long and tedious bureaucratic process, shaped in its infancy as  
method to deal with the realities of the Cold War in the 1960s, then used to reconsolidate 
U.S.  national interests both at home and abroad as a result of the end of the Cold War, 
and now continued in the spirit of the ongoing transformation of the U.S. military as the 
nation continues to prosecute the Global War on Terror around the globe.  
 I have also demonstrated that the results of this bureaucratic process nonetheless 
have a very real economic impact on the communities in which the residents of these 
bases call home.  Some bases, like Reese Air Force Base, weather the storm and rebuild 
themselves into thriving business entities, contributing more to the local economy after 
their closure than they did before.  Others do not, and there is a significant body of 
literature from the early rounds of the BRAC process that points to the dire economic 
consequences for a community beset with the closure of a major military installation, 
especially one away from any large metropolitan area and bereft of any ther large 
industry.   
86 
 
 In light of this knowledge, I postulated the research question, namely, what are 
the effects, if any, of the BRAC closure process on the value of residential r al estate in 
the communities in which these bases are located.  The research question was 
accompanied by the hypothesis that if these bases are truly valuable as economic 
contributors to the local community, as various studies have shown they are in the 
amount of real dollars they bring to the economy through property tax, sales tax, and 
other revenues, then their closure surely ought to have a significant effect on the l cal 
economy, and this effect should manifest itself in the decrease of home values when a
base shuts down.   
 Then using a dataset consisting of both average monthly real estate values and 
transactional home sales prices from a sample set of two military bases, Reese Air Force 
Base and Red River Army Depot, both of which met a set of straightforward and 
common sense criteria established to ensure that they were characteristic of other military 
installations across the country, I tested the theory utilizing a differenc-in-difference 
regression model encompassing both hedonic pricing and event study methodology.      
 The empirical results, as discussed in Chapter 4, present solid evidence supporting 
the original research question and hypothesis.  In the case of Reese Air Force Base, 
which closed its gates for good on 30 September 1997, the empirical results of the model 
clearly indicate that there was a significant effect from the series of announcements that 
occurred prior to the closure of the base, and a most significant effect from the actual 
shutting down of the base altogether.  These results are consistent, in both sign and 
magnitude, with the research hypothesis, as well as with the empirical results of other 
studies. 
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 In the case of Red River Army Depot, the results are also consistent with both the 
research hypothesis and the conventions of both hedonic pricing models and event study 
literature.  As the Department of Defense signaled the closing of Red River Army depot 
through its initial announcement on 13 May 2005, the model revealed a decrease in home 
values, as could be expected.  Conversely, as the BRAC Commission signaled the 
intention to keep Red River Army Depot open and operational with the release of its 
Final Report on 8 September 2005, the model revealed a slight increase in home values, 
again, as one would expect in a community in receipt of “good news” in the real estate 
market.  Thus from a solid research question and hypothesis, a solid empirical model was 
developed, and solid, clearly explainable results were manifested through the process. 
 The single biggest issue with this process is, of course, the strength of the data.  
Literally hundreds of military bases have closed down as a result of the BRAC process 
since 1988, and I am attempting to provide credible support of an affirmative answer to 
the research question by studying only two of those bases, and by utilizing a robust 
dataset with only one of them.  This is indeed the case, and I make no attempt to explain 
this away.  The original research methodology called for the exploration of the research 
hypothesis through the study of two other bases, Fort Chaffe and Fort McClellan, but at a 
specific point in the research process it became clear that the data to test thes  two among 
the sample simply did not exist (at least in a format in which to test it reasonably).  
Clearly more and better data would have made the results more credible and significant; 
an extension of this study to include that data, along with the transactional real estate data 
from other bases that have closed down as a result of the BRAC process is certainly of 
valid academic viability. 
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CHAPTER 7: POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
 
7.1 Policy Implications 
 The policy implications at the national level inherent resulting from this study 
abound.  My empirical work and analysis have clearly demonstrated that there is a direct 
economic effect on a community, manifested in the decreased value of residential real 
estate values, simply when the Department of Defense makes an announcement to close 
down a military installation in the vicinity.  I have also shown that if this base is th n 
closed down, as in the case of Reese Air Force Base in 1995, property values continue to 
decline throughout the closure process.  Furthermore, I have also shown that if a base 
initially marked for closure by the Department of Defense is taken off the list by the 
BRAC Commission and ultimately remains open and operational, as in the case of Red 
River Army Depot, then property values will actually show a significant increase when 
the announcement is made by the BRAC Commission. 
If we do take these results to be worthwhile and significant, as I think we should, 
then there are a whole set of policy implications inherent in the results of this study.  First 
and foremost, it is clear that if the value of residential homed are negatively impacted by 
both the BRAC process as well as the announcements of DoD intentions to shut a base 
down, then the sooner a community can react to this news, and the better off it will be, in 
both the short and long term.  The 2005 BRAC Commission set forth a legislative agenda 
by which it would both be given more time to confront the initial base closure 
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recommendations from the Secretary of State before its own recommendations were due 
to the President, as well as be given an extended period of service as a Commission in 
order to effectively manage the repercussions caused by the process they finalized.  
Expanding the scope and authority of the BRAC Commission in these two simple ways 
might also assist the communities dealing with the future closing of an installation inside 
its borders, as well, giving them more warning and additional resources to combat the 
probable economic downturn that would inevitable come as the community prepares for 
the base’s eventual shut down.   
This, in turn, might very well serve to turn an economic downturn into an 
economic opportunity, resulting in a perceived positive effect from the effect of a 
looming BRAC base closure announcement.  Thus, the research hypothesis, that the 
announcement of a base closure affects the value of residential real estate in the local 
community in a negative way, would actually be reversed.  If policy makers, both in the 
Department of Defense and the United States Congress, as well as those who sit as 
members of future BRAC Commissions, recognize this trend, they might very well be 
able to provide economic assistance ahead of any impending base closures, thus 
preventing the economic downturn in communities that we have witnessed in the past.     
    These results also lead to three clear implications for the Department of Defense 
with respect to the BRAC process as a whole.  First, the Department of Defense must 
recognize that residents of the communities in the bases marked for closure are directly 
affected by the BRAC process in the way of declining property values, and that these 
property values actually begin to decline when the announcement of an impending 
closure is made, not simply when the base closes down.  This is critical information in 
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light of the fact that all previous studies on the economic impact of BRAC focused on 
lost jobs (on the installation) and lost revenue in the community by way of lost sales 
revenue, sales taxes, and property taxes.  Second, the Department of Defense must ot 
deviate from the timeline for the BRAC process, as clearly specified in Public Laws 100-
526 and 101-510, as it did in 2005.  The BRAC Commission received the list of 
recommended closures from the Secretary of Defense on 13 May, 2005, nearly     
seventy-five days after it was required (by law) to be released.  This then gav  the BRAC 
commission less than one-hundred twenty days to complete their work (which, in many 
cases, entailed multiple visits by multiple commissioners to many of the bases that were 
marked for closure) and publish their own recommendations for the President.  The 
Department of Defense is doing a huge disservice to its own people, as well as the 
populations of those communities surrounding military installations, by not rigidly 
adhering to the timeline requirements mandated by law.   
 Finally, the results of this study make it clear that the BRAC process as it t nds 
today, despite some of its identified shortcomings, is a necessary process required to 
ensure as neutral and bipartisan assessment of the Department of Defense’s plan for 
closing bases as possible.  This process must remain neutral and bipartisan in order to 
safeguard these installations, vast and valuable resources of land and capital that serve in 
the best interest of our national security when utilized efficiently and to their full 
potential, and not wantonly wasted.  Any abrogation of this process would serve to do 
exactly the opposite.     
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7.2 Areas for Future Research 
This study lends itself to many extensions.  Primarily among them is the answer 
to the one, overriding socio-economic question surrounding the effect of the BRAC 
process: does the formal BRAC process as established by law in 1988 facilitate or hinder 
the process of shutting down U.S. military bases across the country?  A study of the 
effectiveness and viability of the DoD base closure process prior to 1988, compared to 
the results of the BRAC process after 1988, should be able to definitively answer this 
question. 
A clear extension of this paper must also include elements of the original study I 
wished to undertake, that is, a study of four separate and distinct bases, on four different 
BRAC closure lists, in different geographic regions of the country, and which followed 
four different processes and timelines with respect to their own individual circumstances.  
Including Fort Chafee, Arkansas (BRAC 1991), Fort McClellan, Alabama (BRAC 1995), 
Reese Air Force Base (BRAC 1995), and Red River Army Depot (BRAC 2005) in a 
future study, given the availability of good data, is certainly a worthwhile and useful 
future study. 
Another study that stems directly from the results found in this paper is one that 
extends the results of the original paper to examine the effect of the BRAC 
announcement for base that are designated for realignment, the so-called joint bases 
outlined by the Secretary of Defense in the 2005 BRAC guidance.  Using nearly identical 
methodology and data sets, one can test the same hypotheses that I test here, except look 
exclusively at bases that are expected to grow as a result of the realignmnt process.  
Since income from the military along with other economic opportunities for the 
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communities would increase as a result of a realignment, one would assume that there 
would be a positively correlation between these announcements and the value of real 
estate in the community effected by the announcement.  By law, these twelve 
installations are required to complete all of their realignment and consolidation ac ions by 
15 September 2011, so this study can actually be started now and completed within the 
next three years.   
In line with this, and in light of the ongoing housing dilemma in this nation, a 
study of the value of property in the counties containing military bases around the ation, 
compared to similar counties across states in the same regions, would also seem t b  a 
very viable study.  The 2008 AP study looked at the value of real estate in and around 
four major bases in the United States; this study could be extended using econometric 
tools and analysis to investigate the linkage between the value of real estate and th  
proximity to a military base of some kind in the United States.  This data can be 
compared with local real estate data from around the county.  The mere results of the AP 
story itself are intriguing enough to want to undertake this study. 
This topic also lends itself to further investigation concerning the real option 
value of the land on bases designated for closure throughout the BRAC process.  For 
example, if a firm begins the negotiation process for the purchase of this land from the 
DoD, at what point is the option to purchase, and then develop, the land most valuable?  
Also, in light of some of the findings from both the Rand study (1996) and Hooker and 
Knetter (2001), it would certainly be worthwhile to look at the effects of the BRAC 
closure process in order to determine whether military bases are actually we th-
destroying for the local communities surrounding them.  In other words, if base closings 
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potentially yield a net economic benefit to the local community, as some of the results of 
these two studies appear to indicate, then this implies that military bases have a negative 
net economic effect on the community.  This is very counter-intuitive result, and thus one 
that bear further research. 
A study of the effect of environmental waste and hazards on the value of real 
estate in communities adjacent to bases which underwent an exceptionally long peri d of 
transition to closure once they were identified would also be a very viable study.  As I 
have stated previously, environmental waste and contamination is one of the 
characteristics that makes a base much less attractive to outside business investment once 
it has been identified for closure through the BRAC process.  Once it has been approved 
for closure by the BRAC Commission, an installation undergoes a detailed period of 
intense environmental scrutiny by both the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and 
the office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations & Environment).  If 
the base is identified as having serious environmental issues, it will not be allowd t  
close down until it solves these problems.  An event study could be undertaken into the 
value of real estate in communities adjacent to these sorts of installations, similar to this 
study, except that the event window could be extended closely to include this extra period 
of required environmental clean-up.    
Finally, the effect of the BRAC process on the value of real estate as i  relates to 
overseas base closures is another intriguing study unto itself.  Though it is not an offici l 
component of the BRAC process (due to the obvious fact that DoD land overseas does 
not warrant Congressional oversight in the manner that bases in the United States, insid  
Congressional districts, does), there must almost certainly be an economic effect on the 
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local community overseas when a U.S. base is announced for closure, and eventually, 
when it shuts down for good.  The vast majority of U.S. military bases overseas are under 
the control of the United States as a result of U.S. involvement in the Second World War, 
and, indirectly, as a result of the U.S. involvement in the Cold War with the Soviet 
Union.  As to the winner goes the spoils, so, too, did the U.S. government seize the best 
and most centrally located real estate within the major cities of Germany, It ly, the 
Republic  of Korea, and Japan.  This real estate is extremely valuable to the host nation in 
which it is located, and, in most cases the host nation has paid a great price to extricate 
the property out from under the control of the U.S. government.  A study investigating 
the history of that property once it has been given up by the U.S. would go a long way to 
determining the value of the land for future U.S. land sales overseas.   
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APPENDIX A: COMBINED REGRESSION RESULTS 
 
 
  Bowie County Miller County  Combined Texarkana 
Variable Sample Sample Sample 
Age -0.0254*** (0.0115) -0.0312*** (0.0093) -0.0296*** (0.0115) 
Age Squared 0.0011*** (0.0003) 0.0012*** (0.0004) 0.0 12*** (0.0003) 
Square Feet (x .001) 0.1696*** (0.0384) 0.1731*** (0.0391) 0.1721*** (0.0395) 
Square Feet Squared (x .00001) -0.0002*** (0.0002) -0.0002*** (0.0003) -0.0002*** (0.0004) 
LN Acres   0.0432*    (0.0417)  0.0469*    (0.0428)  0.0448*    (0.0463) 
Distance to Main Gate -0.0707*** (0.0081) -0.0618*** (0.0074) -0.0637*** (0.0090) 
Distance to Airport -0.0621*** (0.0038) -0.0511*** (0.0049) -0.0539*** (0.0087) 
Distance to Bus Station -0.0444      (0.0056) -0.058      (0.0044) -0.0483     (0.0053) 
Distance to Train Station -0.0239        (.0037) -0.0242        (.0021) -0.0241       (.0025) 
ANNOUNCE1 -0.0446*** (0.0316) -0.0512*** (0.0274) -0.0494*** (0.0207) 
ANNOUNCE2 0.0348        (0.0489) 0.0414       (0.0617) 0.0392       (0.0576) 
ANNOUNCE3 0.0549        (0.0340) 0.0522       (0.0388) 0.0528       (0.0444) 
INTER1 0.0242**    (0.0307) 0.0316**    (0.0399) 0.0277**   (0.0385) 
INTER2 -0.0125       (0.0302) -0.0211       (0.0104) -0.0192        (0.0374) 
INTER3 -0.0507*** (0.0197) -0.0618*** (0.0318) -0.0547*** (0.0276) 
Constant 11.6446 12.0218 11.8754 
F-stat 111.45 132.27 123.76 
R² 0.6384 0.6099 0.6147 
Observations 573 2013 2586 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level 
**   Significant at the 0.05 level 
*     Significant at the 0.1 level 
  
  
102 
 
APPENDIX B: DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 2005 BRAC COVER LETTER 
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APPENDIX C: 2005 BRAC COMMISSION REPORT COVER LETTER 
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APPENDIX D: 2005 BRAC DEFINITIONS85 
 
 
BASE CLOSURE LAW 
The provisions of Title II of the Defense Authorization Amendments and Base Closure 
and Realignment Act (Pub. L. 100-526, 102 Stat.2623, 10 U.S.C. S 2687 note), or the 
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 (Pub. L. 100-526, Part A of Title 
XXIX of 104 Stat. 1808, 10 U.S.C. S 2687 note). 
 
BRAC 
“BRAC" is an acronym which stands for base realignment and closure. It is the process 
DoD has previously used to reorganize its installation infrastructure to more effici ntly 
and effectively support its forces, increase operational readiness and facilitate new ways 
of doing business. DoD anticipates that BRAC 2005 will build upon processes used in 
previous BRAC efforts. 
Closure  
All missions of the installation have ceased or have been relocated. All personnel 
positions (military, civilian and contractor) have either been eliminated or relocated, 
except for personnel required for caretaking, conducting any ongoing environmental 
cleanup, and disposal of the base, or personnel remaining in authorized enclaves. 
COBRA 
 Cost of Base Realignment Actions (COBRA), is an analytical tool used to calculate the 
costs, savings, and return on investment, of proposed realignment and closure actions. 
Commission  
The Commission established by section 2902 of the Defense Base Closure and 
Realignment Act of 1990, as amended. 
 
                                                
85 This appendix appears as Appendix O of the Department of Defense 2005 BRAC document. 
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Community preference 
Section 2914(b)(2) of BRAC requires the Secretary of Defense to consider any notice 
received from a local government in the vicinity of a military installation hat the 
government would approve of the closure or realignment of the installation. 
 
Data certification  
Section 2903 (c)(5) of BRAC requires specified DoD personnel to certify to the best of 
their knowledge and belief that information provided to the Secretary of Defense or the 
2005 Commission concerning the realignment or closure of a military installation is 
accurate and complete. 
 
Force structure 
Numbers, size and composition of the units that comprise US defense forces; e.g., 
divisions, ships, air wings, aircraft, tanks, etc. 
Infrastructure Executive Council (IEC) 
One of two senior groups established by the Secretary of Defense to oversee and 
operate the BRAC 2005 process. The Infrastructure Executive Council, chaired by the 
Deputy Secretary of Defense, and composed of the Secretaries of the Military 
Departments and their Chiefs of Services, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and 
Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics)( USD (AT&L)), 
is the policy making and oversight body for the entire BRAC 2005 process. 
Infrastructure Steering Group (ISG) 
The subordinate of two senior groups established by the Secretary of Defense to 
oversee and operate the BRAC 2005 process. The Infrastructure Steering Group, 
chaired by the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics) 
(USD(AT&L)), and composed of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the 
Military Department Assistant Secretaries for installations and environment, the Service 
Vice Chiefs, and the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations & Environment) 
(DUSD(I&E)), will oversee joint cross-service analyses of common business-oriented 
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functions and ensure the integration of that process with the Military Department and 
Defense Agency specific analyses of all other functions. 
Military Departments 
The Military Departments are the Department of the Army, Department of the Navy, 
which includes the Marine Corps, and Department of the Air Force. 
Military installation 
A base, camp, post, station, yard, center, homeport facility for any ship, or other 
activity under the jurisdiction of the Department of Defense, including any leased 
facility. Such term does not include any facility used primarily for civil works, rivers 
and harbors projects, flood control, or other projects not under the primary jurisdiction 
or control of the Department of Defense. 
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) Analysis 
An analysis conducted to evaluate an installation’s disposal decisions in terms of the 
environmental impact. The NEPA analysis is useful to the community’s planning 
efforts and the installation’s property disposal decisions. It is used to support DoD 
decisions on transferring property for community reuse. 
 
Realignment  
Includes any action that both reduces and relocates functions and civilian personnel 
positions, but does not include a reduction in force resulting from workload 
adjustments, reduced personnel or funding levels, or skill imbalances. 
Redevelopment authority 
In the case of an installation to be closed or realigned under the BRAC authority, the 
term “redevelopment authority” means an entity (including an entity established by a 
State or local government) recognized by the Secretary of Defense as the enti y 
responsible for developing the redevelopment plan with respect to the installation or for 
directing the implementation of such plan. 
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Redevelopment plan 
In the case of an installation to be closed or realigned under the BRAC authority, the 
term “redevelopment plan” means a plan that (A) is agreed to by the local 
redevelopment authority with respect to the installation; and (B) provides for the reus  
or redevelopment of the real property and personal property of the installation that is 
available for such reuse and redevelopment as a result of the closure or realignment of 
the installation. 
Secretary  
Secretary of Defense. 
Transformation  
According to the Department’s April 2003 Transformation Planning Guidance 
document, transformation is “ a process that shapes the changing nature of military
competition and cooperation through new combinations of concepts, capabilities, 
people and organizations that exploit our nation's advantages and protect against our 
asymmetric vulnerabilities to sustain our strategic position, which helps underpin peace 
and stability in the world.” 
United States 
 The 50 states, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, the 
Virgin Islands, American Samoa, and any other territory or possession of the Unied
States. 
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APPENDIX E: MAJOR BASE CLOSURES BY BRAC ROUND 
 
 
BRAC 1988 
16 Major Closures 
 
1. Army Material Tech Lab, MA                 
2. Cameron Station, VA                            
3. Chanute AFB, IL                                   
4. Fort Douglas, UT  
5. Fort Sheridan, IL  
6. George AFB, CA  
7. Jefferson Proving Ground, IN  
8. Lexington Army Depot, KY  
9. Mather AFB, CA  
10. Naval Station Brooklyn, NY  
11. Naval Station Lake Charles, LA  
12. Naval Station, Galveston, TX  
13. Norton AFB, CA  
14. Pease AFB, NH  
15. Philadelphia Naval Hospital, PA  
16. Presidio of San Francisco, CA 
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BRAC 1991 
26 Major Closures 
1. Bergstrom AFB, TX 
2. Carswell AFB, TX  
3. Castle AFB, CA  
4. Chase Field NAS, TX  
5. Eaker AFB, AR  
6. England AFB, LA  
7. Fort Benjamin Harrison, IN  
8. Fort Devens, MA  
9. Fort Ord, CA  
10. Grissom AFB, IN  
11. Hunters Point Annex, CA  
12. Loring AFB, ME  
13. Lowry AFB, CO  
14. Moffett NAS, CA  
15. Myrtle Beach AFB, SC  
16. Naval Electrical Systems Engineering Center, San Diego, CA  
17. Naval Station Long Beach, CA  
18. Naval Station Philadelphia, PA  
19. Naval Station Puget Sound, WA  
20. Philadelphia Naval Shipyard, PA  
21. Richards-Gebaur ARS, MO  
22. Rickenbacker AGB, OH  
23. Sacramento Army Depot, CA  
24. Tustin MCAS, CA  
25. Williams AFB, AZ  
26. Wurtssmith AFB, MI 
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BRAC 1993 
28 Major Closures 
1. Charleston Naval Shipyard, SC 
2. Defense Per. Support Center, PA  
3. Gentile Air Force Station, OH (DESC)  
4. Homestead AFB, FL  
5. K.I. Sawyer AFB, MI  
6. Mare Island Naval Shipyard, CA  
7. MCAS El Toro, CA  
8. Naval Air Station Agana, Guam  
9. Naval Air Station Barbers Point, HI  
10. Naval Air Station Cecil Field, FL  
11. Naval Air Station Dallas, TX  
12. Naval Air Station Glenview, IL  
13. Naval Airs Station Alameda, CA  
14. Naval Aviation Depot Alameda, CA  
15. Naval Aviation Depot Norfolk, VA  
16. Naval Aviation Depot Pensacola, FL  
17. Naval Hospital Oakland, CA  
18. Naval Station Charleston, SC  
19. Naval Station Mobile, AL  
20. Naval Station Staten Island, NY  
21. Naval Station Treasure Island, CA  
22. Naval Training Center Orlando, FL  
23. Naval Training Center San Diego, CA  
24. NESEC, St. Inigoes, MD  
25. Newark AFB, OH  
26. O'Hare IAP ARS, IL  
27. Plattsburgh AFB, NY 
28. Vint Hill Farms, VA 
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BRAC 1995 
27 Major Closures 
 
1. Bayonne Military Ocean Terminal, NJ  
2. Bergstrom Air Reserve Base, TX  
3. Defense Dist. Depot Memphis, TN  
4. Defense Distribution Depot Ogden, UT  
5. Fitzsimmons Army Medical Center, CO  
6. Fleet Industrial SU. Center, Oakland, CA  
7. Fort Chaffee, AR  
8. Fort Holabaird, MD  
9. Fort Indiantown Gap, PA  
10. Fort McClellan, AL  
11. Fort Pickett, VA  
12. Fort Ritchie, MD  
13. McClellan AFB, CA  
14. Naval Air Facility, Adak, AK  
15. Naval Air Station, South Weymouth, MA  
16. Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division, Indianapolis, IN  
17. Naval Shipyard, Long Beach, CA  
18. NAWC, Aircraft Div., Warminster, PA  
19. NAWC, Crane Division Detachment, Louisville, KY  
20. NSWC, Dahlgren Division Detachment, White Oak, MD  
21. Oakland Army Base, CA  
22. Ontario IAP Air Guard Station, CA  
23. Reese AFB, TX  
24. Roslyn Air Guard Station, NY  
25. Savanna Army Depot Activity, IL  
26. Seneca Army Depot, NY  
27. Ship Repair Facility, Guam 
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APPENDIX F: MAJOR BASE REALIGNMENTS BY BRAC ROUND 
 
 
BRAC 1988 
11 Major Realignments 
 
1. Fort Bliss, TX  
2. Fort Devens, MA  
3. Fort Dix, NJ  
4. Fort Holabird, MD  
5. Fort Huachuca, AZ  
6. Fort McPherson, GA  
7. Fort Meade, MD  
8. Fort Monmouth, NJ  
9. Naval Station Pugent Sound, WA  
10. Pueblo Army Depot, CO  
11. Umatilla Army Depot, OR 
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BRAC 1991 
19 Major Realignments 
1. Aviation Systems Command/Troop Support Command, MO  
2. Beale Air Force Base, CA  
3. Fort Chaffee, AR  
4. Fort Polk, LA  
5. Letterkenny Army Depot, PA  
6. MacDill Air Force Base, FL  
7. Naval Air Development Center, Warminster, PA  
8. Naval Air Engineering Center, Lakehurst, NJ  
9. Naval Air Propulsion Center, Trenton, NJ  
10. Naval Avionics Center, Indianapolis, IN  
11. Naval Coastal Systems Center, Panama City, FL  
12. Naval Ordnance Station, Indian Head, MD  
13. Naval Ordnance Station, Louisville, KY  
14. Naval Surface Weapons Center, White Oak, MD  
15. Naval Undersea Warfare Engineering Station, Keyport, WA  
16. Naval Weapons Center, China Lake, CA  
17. Naval Weapons Support Center, Crane, IN  
18. Pacific Missile Test Center, Point Magu, CA  
19. Rock Island Arsenal, IL 
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BRAC 1993 
14 Major Realignments 
1. Anniston Army Depot, AL  
2. Fort Belvoir, VA  
3. Fort Monmouth, NJ  
4. Griffiss Air Force Base, NY  
5. Letterkenny Army Depot, PA  
6. March Air Force Base, CA  
7. Marine Corps Logistics Base Barstow, CA  
8. Naval Air Station Memphis, TN  
9. Naval Education and Training Center, Newport, RI  
10. Naval Surface Warfare Center (Dahlgren)  
11. Naval Weapons Station Seal Beach, CA  
12. Ogden Air Logistics Center, Hill Air Force Base, UT  
13. Tooele Army Depot, UT  
14. White Oak Detachment, White Oak, MD 
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BRAC 1995 
14 Major Realignments 
 
1. Charles E. Kelly Support Center  
2. Defense Contract Management Command International, Dayton  
3. Defense Distribution Depot Columbus  
4. Eglin Air Force Base  
5. Fort Dix  
6. Fort Lee  
7. Grand Forks Air Force Base  
8. Guam Fleet and Industrial Supply Center  
9. Guam Naval Activities  
10. Guam Public Works  
11. Hill Air Force Base (Utah Training and Test Range)  
12. Kelly Air Force Base  
13. Naval Air Station Corpus Christi  
14. Naval Air Station Key West  
15. Naval Information Systems Management Center, Arlington  
16. Naval Undersea Warfare Center Keyport  
17. Red River Army Depot, Texarkana, TX 
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APPENDIX G: MAJOR BASE CLOSURE RECOMMENDATIONS, 2005 
  
 
State Installation Net Gain/Loss 
CA Naval Support Activity Corona -1,795 
 
CT New London Submarine Base -15,806 
 
DC Walter Reed Army Medical Ctr -9,797 
 
GA Fort Gillem -1,823 
 Fort McPherson -6,846 
 Naval Air Station Atlanta -2,304 
 
LA Naval Support Activity New Orleans -4,726 
 
ME Portsmouth Naval Shipyard -9,165 
 
MS Naval Station Pascagoula -1,760 
 
ND Grand Forks AFB -4,928 
 
NJ Fort Monmouth -9,736 
 
NM Cannon AFB -4,778 
 
NY Niagara Falls International Airport Air Guard Station -1,072 
 
SC South Naval Facilities Engineering -1,730 
 
SD Ellsworth AFB -6,765 
 
TX Brooks City Base -5,722 
 Naval Air Station Ingleside -4,799 
 Red River Army Depot -4,175 
 
VA Fort Monroe -7,982 
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APPENDIX H: MAJOR BASE REALIGNMENT RECOMMENDATIONS, 2005 
 
State Installation Net Gain/Loss 
AK Eielson AFB -4,710 
 
AL Anniston Army Depot 1,705 
 Fort Rucker 3,820 
 Maxwell AFB -2,187 
 Redstone Arsenal 4,880 
 
AR Little Rock AFB 3,182 
 
CA Naval Air Weapons Station China Lake 5,809 
 Naval Base Ventura County -4,084 
 
CO Fort Carson 7,627 
 
FL Eglin AFB 2,560 
 Naval Air Station Jacksonville 4,371 
 
GA Fort Benning 13,955 
 
IL Scott AFB 1,165 
 
KY Fort Knox -3,121 
 
KS Fort Riley 4,486 
 
MA Hanscom AFB 2,224 
 
MD Aberdeen Proving Grounds 2,500 
 Bethesda National Naval Med Ctr 3,350 
 Fort Meade 8,790 
ME Brunswick Naval Air Station -4,264 
 
NC Fort Bragg – Pope AFB 8,052 
 
OK Fort Sill 5,451 
 
TX Fort Bliss 20,403 
 Fort Hood 8,521 
 Fort Sam Houston 17,061 
 Lackland AFB -4,155 
 Naval Air Station Corpus Christi -2,063 
 Sheppard AFB -3,961 
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VA Fort Belvoir 20,217 
 Fort Eustis -4,375 
 Fort Lee 10,442 
 Naval Shipyard Norfolk 3,228 
 Quantico Marine Corps Base 5,221 
 
WA Naval Shipyard Bremerton 2,788 
  
 
